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THE IGRA AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT:
INDIAN TRIBES ARE GAMBLING WHEN
THEY TRY TO SUE A STATE
AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE

To best understand the complex interplay between state regulation of gambling on Indian reservations and the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA),' it is helpful to read the following
hypothetical.
The Tatanka Indian Tribe is a federally recognized tribe 2 located in the state of Caledonia. 3 In the past, the tribal government 4 received the majority of its funds from the federal
government. Over the past decade, however, the federal government has urged the Tatanka Tribe to generate a larger proportion
of the tribal government's funds in the hope that one day the tribe
will become economically independent. 5
In 1986, the Tatanka began operating bingo6 games at the com7
munity center, a room with the capacity for one hundred players.
1. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988).
2. The Advisory Council on California Indian Policy Act of 1992 defines a
federally recognized Indian tribe as "any Indian tribe, band, group, or community ... that has been federally recognized or acknowledged by the United
States Government through an Act of Congress, a Federal judicial decision, or
an administrative decision by the Secretary pursuant to part 83 of title 25, Code
of Federal Regulations." Pub. L. No. 102-416, § 3, 106 Stat. 2131, 2132 (1992).
3. The Tatanka Tribe has over two hundred members residing on its reservation which is ruled by a tribal government.
4. The Tatanka have adopted a constitution and are governed by such pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1934).
5. The federal government has expressed its desire to remove tribal nations from federal funding in the enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act. 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1988). Congress stated that the purpose of this Act is to
promote tribal economic development and self-sufficiency. Id.
6. For the purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the term "bingo"
is defined as the game of chance, manual or electronic:
(I) which is played for prizes, including monetary prizes, with cards bearing numbers or other designations,
(II) in which the holder of the card covers such numbers or designations
when objects, similarly numbered or designated, are drawn or electronically determined, and
(III) in which the game is won by the first person covering a previously
designated arrangement of numbers or designations on such cards.
Id. § 2703(7)(A)(i) (1988).
7. The Tatanka reservation contained no natural resources from which the
tribe could generate revenue, so the tribe turned to gambling. In 1988, the
Tatanka were conducting bingo games five nights a week, and the stakes have
been gradually increasing.
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The bingo games are run exclusively by tribal members" and are
attended mostly by non-Indians who reside in close proximity to the
reservation.9 The Tatanka are proud of their success, and the bingo
operations provide tribal revenue of which the Tatanka are in dire

need. The Tatanka are optimistic that expanding their bingo operations would enable the tribe to provide a better future for those
living on the reservation. 10
Prior to November 1988, the Tatanka government regulated its
bingo games without interference from the state or federal governments.' 1 However, in 1988, Congress passed the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act 12 which provided for the regulation of gambling activities on Indian lands throughout the nation.' 3 In order to continue bingo operations under the IGRA, the tribe had to submit an
ordinance to the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission, which regulates the bingo games. 14 The Tatanka did not wish
to jeopardize the funds generated from bingo and submitted their
resolution to the Chairman in February 1989. The Chairman approved the ordinance, and the Tatanka continued to operate bingo
games on their reservation.
8. The bingo operations provide employment for over twenty Tatanka Indians. However, over one quarter of the tribal population is still unemployed.
Over a third of the tribe's members do not have the equivalent of a high school
education, and the present dropout rate does not indicate any improvement.
9. The Tatanka reservation is located on the border of two states with cities with populations over 100,000 within sixty miles of the reservation in each
state. Most patrons of the bingo games reside in either of these cities.
10. The Oneida Tribe of Wisconsin has established a hotel, printshop, and
other businesses through its casino operations and the tribal budget is up
twenty-fold with the employment rate up tenfold. Susan Stanich, Indians Say
States Stack the Deck Against Reservation Gambling Operations, WASH. POST,
Aug. 2, 1992, at A16. The Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians in Minnesota
generated more than $22 million in the first 208 days of operating a casino
which employed 900 full and part-time people. Patrick, Viva Mille Lacs!, CORP.
REP. MiNN., Apr. 1992, at 48. The tribe placed $15 million of tax-exempt bonds
on the market backed by casino revenues. Karen Pierog, Indian Tribes Come
Back to Muni Market with Big Revenues from Casino Gambling, BOND BUYER,
Aug. 27, 1992, at 1. The tribe plans to build a grade school, a high school, a
health clinic, and make infrastructure improvements with the proceeds. Id.
The average unemployment rate on our nation's reservations in early 1992
was forty percent. James N. Baker, Gambling on the Reservations, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 17, 1992, at 29. This is certain to change, as such tribes, for example, as
the Mashantucket Pequot Indians in Connecticut opened a $58 million casino
which employs 2300 people. Id. Reservation gambling is now a $1 billion industry. Id.
11. Caledonia allows non-profit charities to conduct similar bingo games
and "casino nights," with strict limitations on wager amounts. Though the
prizes offered at the Tatanka bingo games exceed these limits, Caledonia has
made no attempt to restrict these Tatanka operations.
12. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 2710(b)(1)(B).

19931

The IGRA and the Eleventh Amendment

The Tatanka government believes the success of the bingo
games illustrates that a larger scale operation could be prosperous. 15 The tribal government contacted a gambling management

firm in late 1990 for the purpose of building and operating a casino
on the Tatanka reservation. 16 The management firm advised the
Tatanka of the requirements the tribe needed to meet before the
Tatanka could conduct such gambling activities on their reservation. Among these is the IGRA requirement that the Tatanka no17
tify Caledonia of its proposal to conduct casino-type gambling.
Further, the tribe and the state must reach an agreement which
will govern the gambling activities on the Tatanka reservation.18
In March 1991, the Tatanka government informed the governor of Caledonia of its desire to engage in casino-type gambling and
requested a meeting with the state officials in order to negotiate an
agreement pursuant to the IGRA. The Tatanka and state officials
met several times, the State remained unwilling to negotiate with
the Tatanka regarding any type of gambling beyond the bingo
games presently operated on the reservation. 19 The Tatanka felt
that their requests were in compliance with the IGRA and that the
20
state was not negotiating in good faith as required by the IGRA.
15. The capacity of the tribe's community center has limited the growth of
the bingo games, and the Tatanka remain highly dependent on diminishing federal funds. The tribal government leaders believe expanding their gambling
operations could solve many of the tribe's financial worries. The Tatanka want
to open a casino similar to those in Las Vegas or Atlantic City, except on a
smaller scale. Moreover, they need assistance from outside the tribe in the
areas of funding and management.
16. Though most Indian tribes require outside help to run a casino, they
must be very careful in their selection. In October 1990, the Seneca-Cayugas of
Oklahoma hired Wayne Newton Enterprises to manage their failing casino.
David Segal, Dances with Sharks: Why the Indian Gaming Experiment's Gone
Bust, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1992, at 26. To get the casino back on track, the
tribe was asked to add $524,000 to the salary of Wayne Newton, who is half
American Indian, $125,000. Id. The casino grossed $12.5 million in 1991, but
Newton Enterprises' books showed an improbable debt of $360,000 which the
tribe was asked to cover (the tribe never saw Newton's $125,000 again either).
Id. The total payment made to the tribe the same year was $13,000, while the
salary of Newton's floor manager was seven times that amount. Id. When
jackpot winners were unable to get their checks cashed, the tribe brought legal
action and had their contract with Newton Enterprises rescinded. Id. at 27. It
is yet to be decided who will cover the accumulated debt. Id.
17. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(2)(A) (1988).
18. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
19. Caledonia operated a lottery and instant win games which the state desired to protect. The state felt the bingo games on the Tatanka reservation
posed no serious threat to the state-run gambling, but a casino had great potential to infringe upon Caledonia's gambling profits. Today, thirty-three states
run lotteries, and in 1991 these states netted a total of $8 billion. Taegan D.
Goddard, Legalized Gambling Can Benefit Marketplace, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 12,
1992, at A19. With lotteries generating such governmental funds, the states
are very interested in protecting the lotteries from competing operations. See
infra note 56 for a discussion of state legalized gambling.
20. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(3)(A) (1988).
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In December 1991, the Tatanka brought suit against Caledonia
and the governor in federal district court, asking the court to order
Caledonia to comply with the IGRA and to negotiate in good faith
with the Tatanka. The court, however, granted the state's motion
to dismiss on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution barred the action. Therefore, the Tatanka can sue neither
the state nor the governor to compel them to negotiate an agreement with the tribe regarding gambling regulation on the Tatanka
reservation because they do not have access to a forum in which to
raise these contentions. Thus, the Tatanka's hope of generating
revenue from casino-type gambling has died, and, along with it, the
Tatanka's hope of becoming fiscally self-sufficient.
INTRODUCTION

The hypothetical dilemma the Tatanka faced represents the
current constraints the law places on Indians who attempt to
achieve economic independence through funds generated by casinotype gambling. In response to the increasing number of tribes engaging in gambling activities, 2 1 Congress enacted the IGRA with
the intent of promoting tribal government, economic development,
and self-sufficiency. 22 However, recent federal district court deci23
sions prevent Indian tribes from realizing these goals.
The IGRA provides that a state and an Indian tribe must enter
into an agreement (tribal-state agreement) which will govern the
gambling activities on the tribe's land. 2 4 After a state receives a
request from an Indian tribe to negotiate a tribal-state agreement,
the state must negotiate the agreement in good faith.25 The IGRA
further provides that United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over any action brought by an Indian tribe arising from the
state's failure to conduct negotiations in good faith. 2 6 However,
federal district courts cannot enforce the provisions of the IGRA because the Eleventh Amendment bars any action by an Indian tribe
21. Over half of our nation's Indian reservations are now operating a casino
of some kind on their land. Gambling: Bugsy and the Indians, ECONOMISr,
Mar., 1992, at 27.

22. 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1988).
23. See generally Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp.
550, enforced, 784 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Ala. 1992); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Spokane Tribe of
Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (addressing the
issue of whether the Eleventh Amendment bars Indian tribes from bringing
suit against a state under the IGRA).
24.

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B) (1988).

25. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
26. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
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against a state or state official. 2 7
The Eleventh Amendment confirms the notion that the states
entered the Union with their sovereignty intact. 28 Thus, the federal courts are limited by the Eleventh Amendment and cannot provide remedies for all state violations of the Constitution or federal
laws. 2 9 For example, states are immune from actions brought by
foreign nations 30 and individuals, whether or not they reside in the
particular state.3 ' The Eleventh Amendment also provides
the
32
states with immunity from suits brought by Indian tribes.
However, the Eleventh Amendment has not completely barred
actions arising from a state's violation of the Constitution or federal
laws. 33 Three generally recognized exceptions exist which remove

the state's sovereign immunity shield. First, a state may consent to
a suit and waive its immunity. 34 In the context of the IGRA, however, it is not realistic that a state will consent to suit brought by an
Indian tribe.3 5 Second, the state will not afford immunity to an
individual officer if the officer has violated the Constitution or federal laws. 36 The IGRA requires the state to come to an agreement

with the Indian tribe, hence, an order requiring an officer of the
state to conduct good faith negotiations with the tribe is not available because the state is the real party in interest. 3 7 Finally, in
certain situations, Congress can abolish a state's sovereign immu27.

See Poarch, 776 F. Supp. at 553 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment

bars Indian tribes from bringing action against a state and its officials under
the IGRA).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without [the Sovereign's] consent.... Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will
remain with the States ...." Id. (emphasis in original).
29. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-25, at 174 (2d

ed. 1987).
30.

See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322-24 (1934) (holding that

states' Eleventh Amendment immunity also bars suits brought against states
by foreign nations).
31. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment also
bars suits brought by a citizen against his own state).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111
S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (1991) (holding that states did not waive their immunity from
suits brought by Indian tribes when the states ratified the Constitution).

33.

TRIBE,

supra note 29, at 176.

34. See generally Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S.
275, 283 (1959); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883); Carr v. City of
Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that states may consent
to suit and thereby waive their sovereign immunity).
35. See infra notes 170-213 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
states' lack of consent to suit under the IGRA.
36. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
37. See infra notes 214-246 and accompanying text for an application of Ex
parte Young to the IGRA.
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nity by enacting a federal law which clearly expresses this intention.38 Congress did not have the authority to abrogate the states'
immunity through the IGRA because this law was enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution.3 9 Therefore, under the IGRA as it presently exists, federal district courts
cannot order a state to negotiate with an Indian tribe because the
Eleventh Amendment bars this action.
This Note argues that the IGRA in its present state fails to provide the Indian tribes with a forum in which to raise contentions
arising from a state's violation of the IGRA and demonstrates how
Congress can and should rectify this deficiency. Part I of this Note
discusses the general evolution of federal Indian law leading up to
the enactment of the IGRA and the present interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment. Part II analyzes the three exceptions by
which states are not furnished Eleventh Amendment immunity and
discusses why each does not apply to the IGRA. First, Part II
shows that states have not consented to suit under the IGRA. Next,
it demonstrates why an Indian tribe may not seek redress against
an individual state officer in an IGRA action. Finally, Part II concludes that Congress lacked the authority to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity when it enacted the IGRA. In Part III, this
Note submits that Congress could have achieved its purpose by enacting the IGRA pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause
rather than the Indian Commerce Clause. In conclusion, this Note
proposes that, by enacting the IGRA pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Congress may remedy its
failure to provide a forum in which Indian tribes may raise allegations based on violations of the IGRA.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

A.

Gambling and FederalIndian Law

Indian law fundamentally differs from all other areas of American law. This unique status derives from the disparate natures of a
state and an Indian tribe 40 ; unlike a state, an Indian tribe is an
individual sovereign capable of making and enforcing its own laws
outside the federalist structure. 4 1 In 1831, Chief Justice John Mar38. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that Congress has the power to abrogate
the states' immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause and Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment respectively).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see infra notes 247-306 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Congress' power to abrogate and its limitations.
40. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 231-42 (1982).

41.

See generally Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian

Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980); Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711,
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shall characterized
'42
nations.

Indian

tribes

as

"domestic

dependent

1. State Intrusion upon Tribal Sovereignty
In the early development of Indian law, states had no power
over Indians. 43 Only the federal government retained the power to
exercise jurisdiction over Indian activities," except when Congress
expressly granted such power to the states. 45 However, in the late
19th century, courts began to consider the effect of their decisions
46
upon the states when deciding issues relating to Indian tribes.
This balance of interests, which has continued throughout the
evolution of Indian law, also includes the interests of the federal
47
government.
As courts began weighing the interests of the state, federal,
and tribal governments, the resulting opinions often led to confusion.48 In Williams v. Lee,4 9 the Supreme Court introduced the in-

fringement test, the first widely accepted test to weigh these
interests. A violation of the infringement test occurred when a
state intruded upon a tribe's self-governing powers. 50 Subsequently, the Supreme Court developed a test which gave the states
a stronger influence in tribal government, holding that the state
has the power to apply its laws to Indians unless preempted by
treaties or federal statutes. 51 However, in order to promote tribal
713 (1946); United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 360 (1933); United States v.
Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 481 (1926) (noting Indian tribes' dependency on funds
from the federal government).
42. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
43. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1836). For an overview of the
development of Indian law, see Gary Sokolow, The Future of Gambling in Indian Country, 15 Am.INDIAN L. REV. 151, 151-63 (1990); Richard Monette, Comment, Indian Country Jurisdiction and the Assimilative Crimes Act, 69 OR. L.
REV. 269, 269-79 (1990); Connie K. Haslam, Case Note, Indian Sovereignty:
Confusion Prevails-Californiav. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 63 WASH.
L. REV. 169, 169-75 (1988).
44. Williams, 327 U.S. at 713; Chavez, 290 U.S. at 360; Ramsey, 271 U.S. at
471.
45. Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978); McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219
(1959); United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1916); Jones v. Meehan,
175 U.S. 1, 13 (1899) (discussing limitations on tribal sovereignty).
46. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 630 (1882).
47. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
U.S. 373 (1976); United States v. Dakota, 796 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981)
(discussing the interests of the states, Indian tribes, and federal government in
the context of federal Indian law).

48.

COHEN,

supra note 40, at 240.

49. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
50. Id. at 223.
51. This preemption analysis was introduced in McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
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independence, courts were to construe any ambiguities in federal
statutes in favor of the Indians. 52 Originally, tribal Indians only
had to answer to the federal government, 53 but as Indian law
evolved, the courts gave the interests of states greater weight.5 4
2. States' Attempt to Ban Indian Gambling
Indian tribal sovereignty has been the nucleus of several attempts to generate revenue to support a tribal government.5 5 The
most recent venture sweeping the tribal nations is the operation of
gambling facilities on reservation grounds. 56 The proliferation of
Indian gambling resulted in much debate throughout the 1970s and
continues to be a source of conflict today.5 7 Before Congress directly addressed the issue of gambling on Indian reservations, however, the states traveled various avenues in efforts to enforce their
gambling laws on reservations.
The Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) 5 s opens the door for an in52. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392; Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 202
(1975); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968); Alaska
Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); Choate v. Trapp, 224

U.S. 665, 675 (1912); United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 461 (8th Cir. 1974).
53. See Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946); United States v.
Chavez, 290 U.S. 357 (1933); United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467 (1926)
(holding that tribes are answerable only to the federal government).
54. The adoption of the infringement test, which was then broadened under
the preemption analysis, illustrates this development. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
55. The sovereign immunity status has prompted Indian tribes to take advantage of their tax exempt condition in many forms. Their struggle to avoid
state interference did not begin with the surge of gambling on reservations.
Examples of comparable conflicts include the tax-free sales of tobacco and alcohol on Indian reservations. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). The states eventually
won these battles and were able to tax the sales of tobacco and alcohol to nonIndian consumers. Id. This forced tribes to look to other methods of translating
their unique status into economic gain.
56. Over half of the 280 Indian reservations in the country now offer gambling in some form. Gambling: Bugsy and the Indians, ECONOMIST, Mar. 21,
1992, at 27. Under the IGRA, it is a prerequisite to allowing Indian gaming
that the state in which the tribe resides allows a similar form of gambling. The
Indian tribes are not alone in the recent adoption of gambling to achieve financial gain. Several states have such gambling activities as lotteries, scratch-andwin games, and pull-tab games already in existence. This validates the Indian
tribes' right to conduct gaming under the IGRA because gambling is not against
the public policy of these states.
Currently, one-third of the states permit charities to conduct casino nights
under strict regulations. Id. at 28. It follows, then, that the possibility of large
scale casinos on Indian reservations exists in one-third of the states, provided
the remaining criteria of the IGRA are fulfilled. Presently, thirty-three states
run lotteries in this country, while only Utah and Hawaii ban gambling entirely. Goddard, supra note 19, at A19.
57. The Supreme Court issued more decisions on Indian law in the 1970's
than in any other period in our nation's history. Robert C. Pelcyger, Justices
and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 OR. L. REv. 29 (1983).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1969). The ACA provides, in relevant part:
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crease in the power of a state over tribal lands5 9 within its borders.
The ACA provides that anyone guilty of a crime not made punishable by the laws of the Federal Criminal Code may be held accountable if the conduct violated the laws of the state in which it
occurred, but the federal government has the sole power of enforcing the ACA.60 Congress' policy behind the establishment of the
ACA is to prevent any possible shortcomings in the federal criminal
law. 6 1 Hence, through the ACA, Indian nations are to be indirectly
amenable to the criminal laws of the state in areas where the fed62
eral law is silent.
After receiving limited jurisdiction over Indian tribes, the
states attempted to extend it past the criminal statutes. The enactment of Public Law 28063 gave certain named states the power to
exercise broad criminal jurisdiction and limited civil jurisdiction
over tribal lands. 64 Civil jurisdiction was limited to that deemed
Whoever . . .is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made
punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State ...in which such a place
is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission,
shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.
Id.
59. Indian lands are defined as land within the limits of any reservation
under the jurisdiction of the United States, including rights-of-way trans-

gressing the reservation. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427
(1975).
60. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1969).
61. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 288-89 (1958); Williams v.
United States, 327 U.S. 711, 714 (1946); United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d
1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1977).
62. Marcyes, 557 F.2d at 1364.
63. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360(a) (1984)). Section 1162(a) provides:
Each of the States... shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or
against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed to the same extent
that such State . . .has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere
within the State... and the criminal laws of such State shall have the
same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere
within the State ....
Section 1360(a) further provides:
Each of the States listed . . .shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of
action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the
areas of Indian country listed ... to the same extent that such State has
jurisdiction over other causes of action, and those civil laws of such State
that are of general application to private persons or private property shall
have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have
elsewhere within the State.
28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1984).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a). California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and
Wisconsin (known as the "mandatory states") originally assumed these jurisdictional grants under Public Law 280. Id. The purpose in enacting Public Law
280 was an effort to aid reservations lacking adequate law enforcement institutions in which lawlessness posed a serious threat. Carole E. Goldberg, Public
Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 535, 541-42 (1975).
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necessary to resolve private disputes6 5 and did not apply to a state's
regulatory statutes which were thus unenforceable on Indian territory.6 6 Therefore, in the states in which it applied, Public Law 280
was often the determinative statute when a state attempted to com68
67
pel conformity of Indian gaming with existing state restrictions.
In deciding a Public Law 280 case, a court had to determine,
first, whether the relevant state law was criminal or civil in nature. 6 9 If the state law was civil or regulatory, the state was powerless to enforce the law on Indians. However, if the law was criminal
or prohibitory in nature, the state could enforce the law on Indians
and apply their own sanctions if the court found that the Indians
had violated the law. 70 Public Law 280 did not apply in every state,
and the states in which it did not apply sought to regulate the
tribes' gambling by other means.
In attempting to ban Indian gaming, the states further contended that state laws on gambling were applicable to reservations
under the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA). 7 1 Under the
OCCA, a violation of a state or local gambling law became a federal
65. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 376, 383 (1976); Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1986).
66. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 222
(1987).
67. For the purposes of this note, the terms "gambling" and "gaming" are
used synonymously.
68.

Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208; Bryan, 426 U.S. at 383; Seminole Tribe, 658

F.2d at 313.
69. See generally Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); United States v. Farris, 624
F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S.1111 (1981); United States v.
County of Humboldt, 628 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Marcyes,
557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977); Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532
F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975) (utilizing the criminal/prohibitory and civil/regulatory
distinction).
70. In Barona Group of the Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v.
Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983), the
court was faced with deciding whether California's "bingo" laws were criminal
or civil and whether they applied to gaming on Indian land within California.
In applying Public Law 280, the court made the distinction that if a state generally intends to prohibit a specified conduct it may apply its law to Indians under
Public Law 280; however, if the conduct is generally permitted but subject to
regulation, the state may not enforce its law on an Indian reservation because
Congress has not expressly granted this type of civil jurisdiction to the state.
Id. at 1189. Under this analysis, the determining factor often employed in holding a statute to be criminal/prohibitory was whether the conduct was against
the state's public policy. Id. However, this test did not result in consistent case
law for future courts to look to for guidance and, thus, a uniform series of Indian gaming regulations was in demand. Id. at 1190.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1974). The OCCA provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all
or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than $20,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section (1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which (i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is
conducted;
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offense. 72 However, the federal government enacted the OCCA to
prevent the furtherance of organized crime and made no mention of
gambling on Indian land.7 3 Furthermore, only the federal govern-

ment could initiate an OCCA proceeding. 74 However, due to the
policy of promoting economic independence on reservations, the fed75
eral government was hesitant to institute such proceedings.
States themselves could not properly bring an action to prevent Indian gaming under the OCCA. 76 Thus, by way of the ACA, Public

Law 280, and the OCCA, states were unable to restrict the gambling conducted on Indian reservations.
3. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of a state's power to
enforce its gambling regulations on Indian land in California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.7 7 The Cabazon Band of Mission

Indians conducted bingo and card games under the approval of a
federal ordinance. 78 The State of California and Riverside County
attempted to enforce their statutes restricting the operation of
bingo games, and Riverside County also sought to apply its
ordinances which prohibited card games under Public Law 280 and
the OCCA. 79 The tribe instituted an action seeking to enjoin the
state and county from enforcing their ordinances inside the
80
reservation.
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single
day.
Id.
72. In the application of the OCCA, the prohibitory/regulatory test is not
utilized to establish whether Indian gambling violates state law. The courts
need only find that the gambling operations are not consistent with the state's
public policy. Barona Group, 694 F.2d at 1190. Further, unlike Public Law
280, the OCCA was not limited to specified states and could thus apply nationwide. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1974).
73. Christine Guzman, Indian Gambling on Reservations, 24 ARIz. L. REV.
209, 212 (1982).
74. United States v. Dakota, 796 F.2d 186, 188 (6th Cir. 1986).
75. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214
(1987). The Supreme Court stated this policy in Cabazon:
We are not informed of any federal efforts to employ OCCA to prosecute the
playing of bingo on Indian reservations, although there are more than 100
such enterprises currently in operation, many of which have been in existence for several years, for the most part with the encouragement of the
Federal Government.

Id.
76. Dakota, 796 F.2d at 188, affd, Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 214.
77. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
78. The federal ordinance allowed the Cabazons to operate bingo games to
generate tribal funds and promote economic development. Id. at 206.
79. Id. at 205.
80. Id. at 206.
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The Supreme Court employed the prohibitory/regulatory test in
deciding whether Public Law 280 authorized the enforcement of
California's bingo laws on the reservations. 8 ' The Court held that
because California permitted numerous gambling activities-including bingo and a state lottery-California regulated gambling
and could not enforce its bingo laws on the Cabazons under Public
Law 280 reasoning that gambling was not against the public policy
of the State.8 2 The Supreme Court further ruled that the state of
California could not enforce its gambling laws against Indian tribes
under the OCCA because the statute gives no indication that states
are to aid in enforcing federal criminal statutes.8 3 Thus, California
and Riverside County were enjoined from enforcing their gambling
84
laws on the Indian reservations.
The Cabazon decision left states with little opportunity to enforce their gambling restrictions and regulations on Indian reservations. 85 The rise in state operated gambling8 6 meant that Indians
81. Id. at 210. The Supreme Court approved the prohibitory/regulatory test
as employed in Bryan v. Itasca County, 26 U.S. 373 (1976). Id. See also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1986); Barona
Group of the Captain Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Dufly, 694 F.2d 1185
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 929 (1983) (employing the prohibitory/
regulatory distinction).
82. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 211. The Supreme Court included in its analysis
California's public policy on gambling. The fact that California ran a state lottery, permitted betting on horse racing, and allowed the operation of bingo
games persuaded the Court that California's gambling policy was not prohibitory but regulatory. Id. The Court further noted that Public Law 280 does not
authorize the enforcement of local laws on Indian reservations. Id. at 212.
Thus, Riverside County could not prohibit the card games operated by the
Cabazons under Public Law 280. Id.
83. Id. at 212. The Court did note the inconsistency in the application of
the OCCA in the district courts. The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Farris,
624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981), and Barona,
694 F.2d 1185, has looked to the public policy of the state to determine whether
tribal activities violate state law under the OCCA. And the Sixth Circuit in
United States v. Dakota, 796 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1986), has stated there need not
be a prohibitory/regulatory distinction made under the OCCA because the authority of the federal government is being exercised. Id. However, the Supreme
Court failed to resolve this discrepancy by holding that the enforcement of federal criminal statutes under the OCCA is reserved for the federal government.
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 214.
84. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 222
(1987). Before concluding, the Court also weighed the state, tribal, and federal
interests presented in the case. The Court considered the federal interests of
promoting tribal self-government, economic development, and self-sufficiency,
the tribal interests of generating revenues for the tribal government and services; and the state interest of preventing the infiltration of corruption and organized crime into the state. Id. at 219. The Court found that the federal and
tribal interests outweighed the interests of the state because the gambling operations were the sole means of raising revenue and employing tribal members
on the Cabazon reservation. Id. at 220.
85. While the Cabazon ruling did address the form in which the application
of Public Law 280 was to be applied, the ruling was still specific upon the facts
presented and a broad interpretation of its holding was difficult. Id.
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were able to operate similar gambling on their reservations in those
states.8 7 Furthermore, once the court determined that a state permitted some form of gambling and regulated its use, Indian tribes
could conduct gambling on their reservations without interference
or limitations from the state's regulations.8 8 Thus, Indians were
free to regulate their gaming as they saw fit, which usually resulted
in much more extensive gambling than was permitted under state
regulations.8 9
The majority of visitors to Indian gaming operations consisted
typically of non-Indian gamblers, and the state's interest in regulating these activities persisted. However, the tribes and the federal
government were interested in the revenues gambling could provide for tribal governments. After the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of gambling on Indian reservations, 90 it was evident that
Congress needed to consider the interests of the three sovereigns
involved (state, tribal, and federal) and to instill a more uniform
regulation as the number of tribes partaking in gambling grew. 9 1
86. See supra note 56 for a discussion which demonstrates the rise in state
operated gambling.
87. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 222. This was true in states directly affected by
Public Law 280 as well as those in which it did not apply. If the state permitted
some form of gambling, Indian gambling did not offend the state's public policy
and Public Law 280 would not authorize the enforcement of state gambling
laws on reservations. Id. at 209. The federal government would not seek to
prohibit the Indian gaming via the OCCA because this would contradict the
federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency. Id. at 219.
88. See id. at 222. After the court has determined a state may not enforce
its gambling laws on Indian land, Indian gaming did not need to adhere to the
state's gambling regulations at all. For the most part, the tribes were free to
regulate the gaming activities themselves. Id. One exception to this was found
in the Gambling Devices Act (GDA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (1988). The GDA
does not prohibit gaming in general, but only prohibits the use of specific gambling devices, such as slot machines on Indian lands. For an illustration applying the GDA, see United States v. Blackfeet Tribe, 369 F. Supp. 562 (D. Mont.
1973); United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980).
89. For example, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310
(5th Cir. 1981), the district court held that the state could not enforce its gambling laws on the reservation because they were regulatory in nature. The
court also stated that "[wihere the state regulates the operation of bingo halls to
prevent the game of bingo from becoming a money-making business, the Seminole Indian tribe is not subject to that regulation and cannot be prosecuted for
violating the limitations imposed." Id. at 314-15.
90. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
91. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 222. In Cabazon, the Supreme Court did address the interests of the state, tribal, and federal governments. However, the
Court's balancing of these interests was not applicable to the general issue of
gambling on Indian reservations. The Court looked specifically at the fact that
the Cabazon reservation contained no natural resources from which revenue
may have been generated. Id. at 218. The Court found the tribe's interest in
continuing the operation of gambling to be very strong as it was their only
means of raising funds. Id. at 219. Further, the only interest claimed by the
state was the possibility of organized crime influencing the tribal gaming. Id.
The Court did not weigh other possible state interests, such as rise in crime
rates or the rise in alcoholism that generally are attributed to gambling because
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The growing case law on Indian gaming did not fulfill this need and

left many issues unresolved. 9 2 The states' inability to obtain jurisdiction over Indian territory absent express Congressional consent 93 also made it necessary for states to seek to compel Congress
to enact legislation regulating gambling on Indian territory.

B. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)
Before 1988, there was no federal statute directly addressing
the legality of gambling on an Indian reservation. 94 This resulted
in federal courts applying various statutes enacted for other purposes to settle controversies arising from Indian gaming. 9 5 However, as courts based their opinions on these broader statutes, their
holdings either banned or permitted the gambling on Indian reservations without attempting to provide regulated gaming as a remedy. 96 Finally, after years of inconsistent holdings, Congress
enacted the IGRA in 1988. 9 7 This enactment has resolved many
questions about the extent of permissible gambling on Indian
98
territory.
these were not offered to the Court for consideration. Thus, the balancing of
interests in Cabazon was very specific to the facts presented and did not provide for uniform application to all Indian gambling cases. See id. at 222.
92. Before the IGRA, courts were reluctant to regulate Indian gambling. A
court's usual remedy either banned all gambling activities or enjoined the state
from enforcing its gambling laws on reservations. This resulted in either a tribal or state interest having no effect. A compromise between these two interests was needed. See generally Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 218-19 (discussing the

tribe's interest in detail while quickly dismissing the interests of the state).
93. In order for states to assert jurisdiction, they must follow the rule expressed in McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71
(1973), that "[sitate laws generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an
Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State
laws shall apply." Id. at 170-71 (quoting United States Dept. of the Interior,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 845 (1958)).
94. In order to enforce their gambling regulations on Indian land, states
claimed jurisdiction under a variety of federal statutes. See supra notes 55-76
and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutes under which states
sought to enforce such regulations.
95. See generally California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
202 (1987); Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy,
694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983); Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981); Oneida Tribe v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wi. 1981); Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d
478 (Me. 1983); People v. Snyder, 532 N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (demonstrating the various statutes applied in Indian gambling controversies).
96. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202; Barona, 694 F.2d 1185; Seminole Tribe, 658
F.2d 310; Oneida Tribe, 518 F. Supp. 712; PenobscotNation, 461 A.2d 478; Snyder, 532 N.Y.S.2d 827 (illustrating the remedies provided in Indian gaming
conflicts).
97. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1991).
98. The inconsistent analyses and holdings of the pre-IGRA cases are no
longer binding on a court attempting to resolve the applicability of state gambling laws to tribal lands because the adoption of the IGRA provides a uniform
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Congress first attempted to address the issue of regulating
gambling on Indian land in 1983 with House Bill 4566. 99 Although
the bill did not make it to the floor, it demonstrated what was necessary: a compromise of state, tribal, and federal interests on Indian gaming without overly infringing upon tribal sovereignty. 10 0
With this bill, Congress began to address the need for a more uniform regulation of the Indian gambling industry.
Several bills addressing Indian gaming found their way to congressional committees during the Ninety-ninth Congress. One such
measure was Senate Bill 902,101 which required federal standards
and approval of management contracts for Indian gaming, set up a
gambling commission and required gambling regulations to correspond to existing state regulations. 10 2 House Bill 1920103 further
included a provision that tribes may use revenue generated from
gambling only to promote tribal governments. 10 4 House Bill 1920
also established three classes of gambling, each with separate jurisdictional regulations.1 0 5 Finally, Senate Bill 2557106 focused primarily on the regulation of bingo, while incorporating into the
regulation the test of Public Law 280.107 Senate Bill 2557 prohibited bingo on reservations in all states except those which permitted some form of bingo.' 0 8 However, since Congress did not enact
any of these bills, the Indian gaming issue remained unresolved.
In 1988, the regulation came from the 100th Congress, five
years after the introduction of House Bill 4566.109 The congressional answer originated as Senate Bill 555,110 which included sev-

eral sections found in preceding bills on Indian gaming
activities.' 1 ' Senate Bill 555, which became the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, demonstrates the legislature's effort to balance the
three sovereigns' interests while enacting a consistent means of
system of regulation. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1991). However, a historical
background leading up to the enactment of the IGRA is helpful in understanding the need for a uniform regulation and the reasons this regulation took the

form that it did.
99. H.R. 4566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
100. Id.
101. S. 902, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
102. Id.
103. H.R. 1920, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 11(b)(2)(8)(i)-(iv) (1986).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 19 (5)(A)-(C). The three classes of gambling are similar to those
described in the IGRA and discussion of these classes is included in the IGRA
background. See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of

the three classes of gambling.
106. S. 2557, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. H.R. 4566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
110. S. 555, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
111. Id.
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regulating gaming activities on Indian lands. 112
The 100th Congress found that many tribes had engaged in
gaming as a means of generating revenues to support their governments, yet the existing federal law provided confusing standards for
regulating Indian gambling. 113 In addition to including the policies
of promoting economic development, self-sufficiency, and tribal government, 1 14 Congress declared that the purpose of the IGRA was
"to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other corrupting influences... and to declare that the establishment of...
Federal standards for gaming on Indian lands... [is] necessary to
meet congressional concerns regarding gaming ....1
Within the Department of the Interior, the IGRA established
the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC). 1 16 The Commission, which has the authority to oversee the gambling on Indian
land, is funded by tribal gaming operations. 1 17 The NIGC monitors
tribal gaming, inspects the premises of Indian gaming, conducts
background searches on parties involved in operations as it sees fit,
118
and reviews the ledgers and audits of tribal gaming operations.
Furthermore, the Chairman of the NIGC has the authority to temporarily close gaming operations not conforming to the IGRA, to approve tribal gaming ordinances, and to approve any contracts made
between Indian tribes and outside firms in connection with managing the gaming operations on Indian land. 119
The IGRA, like House Bill 1920, categorized gambling into
three classes. 120 Class I gaming includes social games for prizes of
112. Id. The IGRA survived a constitutional challenge since Congress has
unlimited power over Indian tribes and the enactment of the IGRA was a reasonable exercise of Congress' plenary power in which the state's interest in regulating Indian gaming and the tribal interests in self-government were
balanced. See Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. 9
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (upholding the constitutionality of the IGRA).
113. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(1), (3) (1988).
114. Id. § 2701(4).
115. Id. § 2702(2), (3).
116. Id. § 2704. The Commission is composed of three full-time members,
two of which must be members of an Indian tribe. Id. This reflects the federal
policy of tribal self-government. Id.
117. Id. § 2706(a)(2), (3), (b)(1). The Commission is also authorized to provide guidelines for assessing civil fines upon tribal gaming activities and collecting such fines. Id.
118. 25 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(1)-(4) (1988).
119. Id. § 2705 (a)(1)-(4). The chairman is authorized to levy and collect civil
fines. Id.
120. 25 U.S.C. § 2703 (1992). The IGRA adopted many aspects of prior Indian gambling bills; the approval of management contracts, the institution of a
national gambling commission, the requirement that gambling funds be used
solely for general tribal government purposes, and the division of gambling into
three classes from Senate Bill 902, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), and House Bill
1920, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 19(5)(A)-(c).
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little value and forms of gaming involved with traditional tribal ceremonies. 121 The IGRA excludes Class I gaming from regulation,
and the tribes are afforded exclusive jurisdiction. 122 Class II gaming is defined as bingo-type games and card games operated in conformity with state regulations. 123 The IGRA permits gambling of
this type on Indian lands if the state in which the tribe is located
allows any form of the gaming, and the tribe adopts an ordinance
regulating the gaming which meets the approval of the Chairman of
124
the NIGC.
Class III gaming includes all forms of gambling that are not
described in Class I or Class II, including blackjack, lotteries, and
slot machines. 125 Class III gaming must meet the requirements of
Class II gaming to be lawful under the IGRA. 126 In addition, the
tribes must conform to a tribal-state compact addressing the restrictions and regulations of Class III gaming activities. 127 The
tribes must request that the state enter negotiations for such a
128
compact, and states have to negotiate in good faith.
The IGRA also places restrictions on the use of revenues generated from gaming activities. Revenues are to be used only to fund
tribal government operations, to provide general welfare to tribe
members, to promote economic development of the tribe, or to fund
charitable entities or local government agencies. 12 9 However, the
net revenues from gaming may be dispersed to individual tribe
members as well, provided such a plan is fair to all members and is
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 130 Also, any such disbursements are subject to federal taxation. 13 1 Thus, the IGRA promotes tribal economic development without directly benefitting
individual members of the tribe.
Another provision of the IGRA includes the regulation of management contracts. 132 This section seeks to prevent Indians from
entering into unfair management contracts and provides tribes
with a minimum guaranteed payment. 133 It limits management
121. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (1988).
122. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (1988).
123. Id. § 2703(7)(A)(i),(ii) (1988). Class II gaming does not include any
banking card games such as blackjack or baccarat, or any slot machines or simi-

lar electronic games. Id. § 2710(7)(B).
124. Id. § 2710 (b)(1)(A),(B). Here Congress adopted requirements similar to
those involved in a Public Law 280 analysis.
125. 25 U.S.C. § 2703 (8) (1988).
126. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(A)(ii).
127. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(c).
128. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988).
129. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(B)(i)-(v).
130. Id. § 2710(b)(3).
131. Id. § 2710(b)(3)(D).
132. Id. § 2711.
133. 25 U.S.C. § 2711(b)(3).
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contracts to a period of five years' 3 4 and requires strict financial
and accounting disclosure. 13 5 This reflects Congress' intent to promote Indian self-sufficiency and economic independence while
preventing the infiltration of organized crime into the Indian gaming industry.
Congress established a uniform statutory basis 13 6 to regulate
the gambling on Indian lands throughout the nation. 137 In enacting the IGRA, Congress determined that prior existing federal law
provided confusing standards for regulating Indian gambling. 13 8
The IGRA has clarified the prerequisites needed to operate gambling activities on reservations and defined the permitted types of
games. Through the IGRA, Congress addressed the conflict between states and tribes regarding the issue of gambling on Indian
lands. However, the process which enables a tribe to operate class
III gambling 13 9 fails to grant federal district courts the jurisdiction
to hear claims based on this section brought by an Indian tribe because the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution bars such
action.
C. The Eleventh Amendment in Relation to the IGRA
1.

The Relevant Portions of the IGRA

The IGRA permits Class III games only when they are authorized by a tribal ordinance approved by the Chairman of the NIGC,
located on a reservation in a state that permits similar games, and
in compliance with the terms of a tribal-state agreement (compact).' 40 Prior to operating Class III gaming, a tribe must negotiate with the state and enter into a compact.' 4 1 The IGRA requires
134. Id. § 2711(b)(5).
135. Id. § 2711(b)(1).
136. Id. §§ 2701-2721 (1991). The IGRA is not completely uniform. The application of the IGRA varies somewhat from state to state depending on the
degree of gambling permitted in a state, id. § 2710(b)(1)(A), and depending on
the terms agreed to in a tribal-state compact. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
137. Id. § 2702 (2), (3).
138.

25 U.S.C. § 2701(3).

139. Id. § 2710(d).
140. Id. § 2710(d)(1). This section provides:
(d)(1) Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if
such activities are(A) authorized by an ordinance or resolution that(i) is adopted by the governing body of the Indian tribe having jurisdiction over such lands,
(ii) meets the requirements of [Class II gaming], and
(iii) is approved by the Chairman,
(B) located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by
any person, organization, or entity, and
(C) conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered
into by the Indian tribe and the State ....
Id.
141. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A), which provides:
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the state to act in good faith 142 in negotiating the compact. 143
In the event that the state fails to negotiate a compact in good
faith, the IGRA gives federal district courts the jurisdiction to preside over actions initiated by an Indian tribe. 144 If the federal court
finds that the state has failed to negotiate in good faith, the court
may order the state and tribe to finalize a compact within sixty
days. 14 5 Further, the IGRA gives the court the authority to appoint
a mediator to select the governing compact if the state and tribe fail
to come to an agreement within the sixty day allotment. 14 6 Finally,
if the state does not consent to the mediator's compact in sixty days,
the Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the tribe, will de14 7
termine how gambling on the Indian land will be regulated.
Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a
class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall
request the State in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations
for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State shall
negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact.
Id.
142. Good faith is defined as "a total absence of any intention to seek an
unfair advantage or to defraud another party; an honest and sincere intention
to fulfill one's obligations." BARRoN's LAw DIcTIoNARY 208 (3d ed. 1991).
143. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
144. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i), which states:
The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over- any cause of
action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to
enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering
into a Tribal-State compact ... or to conduct such negotiations in good
faith.
Id.
145. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii), which states as follows:
If... the court finds that the State has failed to negotiate in good faith with
the Indian tribe to conclude a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct
of gaming activities, the court shall order the State and the Indian Tribe to
conclude such a compact within a 60-day period.
Id.
146. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv)-(v). This section states:
If a State and an Indian tribe fail to conclude a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities on the Indian lands subject to the
jurisdiction of such Indian tribe within the 60-day period provided in the
order of a court issued under clause (iii), the Indian tribe and the State
shall each submit to a mediator appointed by the court a proposed compact
that represents their last best offer for a compact. The mediator shall select from the two proposed compacts the one which best comports with the
terms of this Act and any other applicable Federal law and with the findings and order of the court. The mediator appointed by the court.., shall
submit to the State and the Indian tribe the compact selected by the mediator ....
Id.
147. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii), which states:
If the State does not consent during the 60-day period.., to a proposed
compact submitted by a mediator ...the mediator shall notify the Secretary [of the Interior] and the Secretary shall prescribe, in consultation with
the Indian tribe, procedures... under which class III gaming may be conducted on the Indian lands over which the Indian tribe has jurisdiction.
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Despite Congress' intent to require the states' to negotiate a

tribal-state compact in good faith, the aforementioned provisions of
the IGRA are unenforceable. The Eleventh Amendment 148 bars an
Indian tribe from bringing suit against a state which has failed to
negotiate a tribal-state compact in good faith. Hence, the federal
district courts do not have the jurisdiction to hear claims brought
by Indian tribes pursuant to Section 2710 of the IGRA.
2.

The Eleventh Amendment Constraints

The provisions of the IGRA which grant tribes the authority to
conduct casino-type gambling on their lands are unenforceable because states are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amend-

ment. The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."1 49 The Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against a state government by citizens of
150
another state or foreign country.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment also bars suits against a state by one of its own citizens even
though this is not explicitly stated. 1 1
The Court recently
explained:
Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans v. Louisiana . . . we
have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for
what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure
which it confirms: that the States entered the federal system with
their sovereignty intact; that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty 15 2 . . . and that a State will therefore not be
subject to suit in a federal court unless it has
to suit, either
3
" 15consented
expressly or in the "plan of the convention.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has extended this immunity
against foreign sovereigns, though the Eleventh Amendment only
148.
149.

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
Id.

150. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 530 (1899).
151.

See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Hans

v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (holding that states are immune from suits
brought by their own citizens under the Eleventh Amendment).
152. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (1991) (citing Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways & Public Trans., 483 U.S. 468, 472
(1987); Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279,
290-294 (1973)).
153. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (citing Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp.
v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 310 (1990); Welch, 483 U.S. at 474; Atascadero State
Hosp., 473 U.S. at 238; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 99 (1984)).
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expresses that states shall be immune from suit by individuals.15 4
However, like most principles in our laws, there are exceptions to
the Eleventh Amendment concept of sovereign immunity.
First, states may expressly waive sovereign immunity through
legislative enactments which intentionally relinquish the state's
immunity.15 5 Though disfavored, sovereign immunity may also be
overcome if a state has implicitly consented to suit.l 56 Further, an
individual state officer who acts in violation of the Constitution or
federal laws is not afforded the state's immunity. 157 Finally, under
some circumstances the state's consent is not necessary, and Congress itself can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity. 5 8
Before 1991, federal courts did not consider the inability of an
Indian tribe to bring suit against a state under the IGRA. 159 This
is because federal courts interpreted 28 United States Code Section
1362160 as an abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 16 1 Thus, in an IGRA claim, the court would not have to rule
on whether the IGRA itself needed to fall within one of the excep154. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934) (holding that there
was no basis found in the plan of the convention by which a foreign state may
overcome a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity).
155. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974); Clark v. Barnard, 108
U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (illustrating how states may waive their sovereign
immunity).
156. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (stating that courts are reluctant to find a state has implicitly consented to suit).
157. See Halderman,465 U.S. at 131-32; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 15051 (1908); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550, 562-63
(S.D. Ala. 1991) (holding actions against state officials are not barred by the
Eleventh Amendment if the official has violated a federal law or the
Constitution).
158. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989); Atascadero State
Hosp., 473 U.S. at 238; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976); Sault Ste.
Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, No. 1: 90-CV-611, 1992 WL
71384, at *2 (W.D. Mich. March 26, 1992) (holding that Congress has the power
to abrogate the states' immunity in certain situations). The Eleventh Amendment is also limited in that it is a bar to suit only against the state and its
agencies, and not local governments or their agencies. Lake County Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1979).
159. See generally Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 951 F.2d 757 (7th
Cir. 1991); United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. Oklahoma, 927 F.2d
1170 (10th Cir. 1991); Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 743 F. Supp. 645 (W.D. Wis. 1990); Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux
Tribe v. United States Dept. of Justice,,718 F. Supp. 755 (N.D. S.D. 1989) (demonstrating the various theories states proposed in attempting to restrict Indian
gambling).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988). Section 1362 provides: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by an Indian tribe or
band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior,
wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.
161. See generally Oneida Tribe of Indians, 951 F.2d at 759; United
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, 927 F.2d at 1173; Lac du Flambeau
Band of Lake Superior ChippewaIndians, 743 F. Supp. at 646; Sisseton-Wahpe-
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tions discussed above because the court would establish jurisdiction
under section 1362.162
However, in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,16

3

the

Supreme Court held that Section 1362 was not an abrogation of
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 164 The Court reasoned
that given Section 1331,165 which gave federal courts jurisdiction to
hear certain civil actions in which the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000,166 the purpose of Section 1362 was to eliminate the

minimum amount in controversy for certain claims brought by
tribes. 16 7 The Supreme Court ruled that Section 1362 granted the
federal courts jurisdiction to hear such claims, but did not abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 168 Thus, a tribe seeking relief must establish federal court jurisdiction independent of
Section 1362 in order to overcome the states' sovereign immunity. 16 9 The IGRA does not override the Eleventh Amendment immunity because it does not fall within one of the recognized
exceptions.
ton Sioux Tribe, 718 F. Supp. at 755 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1362 effectively
confers jurisdiction upon the federal district courts).
162. The jurisdictional problem contained in the IGRA was not an issue prior
to the Supreme Court case, Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct.
2578 (1991), in which the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1362, in itself, was not an
abrogation of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 2582. Prior to
the Blatchford holding, the federal district courts were not required to establish
jurisdiction under the IGRA itself because the courts used § 1362 to establish
jurisdiction to hear Indian claims such as those pursuant to the IGRA. Oneida
Tribe, 951 F.2d at 759.
163. 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
164. Id. at 2585.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964) (amended 1976, 1980). At the time section
1362 was enacted, section 1331 stated: "The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. The $10,000 requirement was amended 1980. Id.
166. Id.

167. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2583. The Blatchford Court stated this reason-

ing finds support in the title of the Act which adopted section 1362: "To amend
the Judicial Code to permit Indian tribes to maintain civil actions in Federal
district courts without regard to the $10,000 limitation, and for other purposes." Id. (citing 80 Stat. 880).
168. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2585 n.4. The Court stated:
In asserting that § 1362's grant of jurisdiction to 'all civil actions' suffices to
abrogate a state's defense of immunity, . . . the [dissent] has just repeated

the mistake of the Court in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793)... the

case that occasioned the Eleventh Amendment itself. The fact that Congress grants jurisdiction to hear a claim does not suffice to show Congress
has abrogated all defenses to that claim. The issues are wholly distinct....
The [dissent's] view returns us . . . to the beginning of this 200-year
struggle.
Id. (emphasis in original).
169. Spokane Tribe v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (E.D. Wash.
1991) (holding that sovereign immunity must be overcome by a source independent of 28 U.S.C. § 1362).
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II.

THE APPLICATION OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

TO THE

IGRA

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
grants the states immunity from suits in federal courts. However,
an Indian tribe may overcome this immunity if it can show the state
has consented to suit and waived its immunity, if it obtains an order requiring a state official to enter into a tribal-state compact, or
if Congress abrogated the states' immunity when it enacted the
IGRA. The following analysis addresses these exceptions to sovereign immunity in the context of the IGRA.
A.

States Have Not Waived Sovereign Immunity

An Indian tribe may attempt to overcome a state's sovereign
immunity by claiming the state has consented to suit under the
IGRA. An Indian tribe intending to operate Class III gaming on its
reservation must first negotiate an agreement with the state in the
form of a tribal-state compact. 170 If, during negotiations, the tribe
and the state come to an impasse, or if the state refuses to negotiate, the tribe may bring suit in a federal district court under the
IGRA. 17 1 However, Section 1362 gives the district court the authority to merely hear the case, 172 and the tribe must still overcome
173
the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The tribe can defeat this jurisdictional problem if it can show
that the state has consented to suit and, thus, waived its sovereign
immunity. The Supreme Court stated that "States of the Union,
still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from
suits, without their consent, save where there has been 'a surrender
of this immunity in the plan of the convention.' ",174 Thus, it is
possible for a tribe to defeat the state's immunity by showing that
the state explicitly consented to a particular lawsuit or that the
state implicitly consented to the suit when it adopted the United
States Constitution. 1 7 5 In the case of a tribe bringing action under
the IGRA, the states have not consented, either expressly or by
adopting the Constitution, to waive their Eleventh Amendment
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988).
Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2585 (1991).
Spokane Tribe, 790 F. Supp. at 1060.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984)
(citing THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)); Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1934); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F.
Supp. 550, 553-554 (S.D. Ala. 1991)).
175. See PoarchBand, 776 F. Supp. at 554 (stating states can waive sovereign immunity expressly or by implication when they joined the Union).
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immunity.176
At one time, the standard to determine whether a state expressly waived its immunity was whether the state intentionally
relinquished its constitutional right not to be sued. 177 Today,
however, most courts require that express consent be given through
legislative enactment. 178 It is highly unlikely that a state which
wishes to restrict gambling on Indian land will explicitly consent to
be sued by a tribe under the IGRA in the event that its negotiations
for a tribal-state compact come to a halt. In fact, only one tribe has
even asserted this claim, and it was not successful. 179 Therefore,
an Indian tribe suing for enforcement of the IGRA will not overcome a state's immunity by arguing that the state expressly con80
sented to such suit.'
More viable is the possibility that a state implicitly consented
to be sued under the IGRA by Indian tribes when it adopted the
Federal Constitution. By accepting the Constitution, a state consented to jurisdiction that was "inherent in the constitutional
plan."' 8 ' Courts have found this constructive consent in various

forms; for example, states are not immune from suits by the United
States 18 2 or by sister states.' 8 3 Because the Eleventh Amendment
has been interpreted far beyond its literal language, federalism
principles behind the amendment have governed its application.18 4
176. Id. at 557; Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800
F. Supp. 1484, (W.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that Michigan did not implicitly surrender its immunity by adopting the Constitution).
177. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (discussing the standard for determining if a state has consented to suit).
178. See Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that
the state must declare its intention to waive immunity through legislative
enactment).
179. See Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550, 554
(S.D. Ala. 1991) (holding that the state did not expressly consent to suits
brought by Indian tribes under the IGRA).
180. Id.
181. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934).
182. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 642 (1892) (relying upon
United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211 (1890), rev'd on other grounds,
West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 (1987)) (holding that states
implicitly consented to be sued by the federal government when they ratified
the Constitution).
183. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 295 (1904) (holding
that states implicitly waived their immunity from suits brought by other states
when they joined the Union).
184. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment has been extended far beyond its literal language). "Federalism" signifies "a system of government wherein power is divided by a
constitution between a central government and local governments, the local
governments maintaining control over local affairs and the central government
being accorded sufficient authority to deal with national needs and affairs."
TRIBE, supra note 29, § 3-4, at 28. Federalism principles play a major role in
the interpretation of the United States Constitution. Id.
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Federalism principles do not suggest that states have consented to suits brought by Indians when the state adopted the Constitution. Indian tribes in this country are "domestic dependent
nations" with attributes of sovereignty.18 5 Thus, tribes do not fit
into a general category previously described in relation to the Eleventh Amendment (individuals, sister states, United States government, or foreign sovereigns). In hopes of overcoming a state's
immunity from suit, tribes have claimed they fit into the category of
a sister state.1 8 6 Indian tribes are domestic and have been held
87
distinct, for Eleventh Amendment purposes, from foreign states.1
Indian tribes are not individuals because they have attributes of
sovereignty.1 8 8 Indian tribes, like the states, were present in this
country when the Union was formed.18 9 The United States has
sued the states for the benefit of Indian tribes in the past, but only
recently have the tribes been recognized as possessing the ability to
act for themselves. 190 Thus, tribes claim that the Eleventh Amendment should not bar an Indian tribe from bringing suit against one
of the states because sister states and the federal government are
not barred from doing such.
However, a state did not surrender its immunity from suits by
Indian tribes when it adopted the Constitution. 19 1 The states' consent to suit by the United States for the benefit of Indians is not
consent to suit by the Indians themselves. 192 States are not
granted Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits by sister states
and the United States because of the role each state played in the
formation of the Union. 193 States are not immune from suits by
185.

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).

186. See Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991) (stating that Indian tribes possess characteristics similar to states).
187. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S.(5 Pet.) at 18.
188. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 361 (1919).
189. Native Village of Noatak, 896 F.2d at 1163.
190. See id. at 1163-64 (holding that, though the federal government has

sued the states on the Indian tribes' behalf in the past, when the tribes brought
suit against the states themselves, the states retain their Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
191. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2580 (1991)
(holding that the states did not waive their immunity from suits brought by
Indian tribes when the states joined the Union).

192. Id. at 2584. The Blatchford Court ruled:
The consent, "inherent in the convention," to suit by the United States

-

at

the instance and under the control of responsible federal officers - is not
consent to suit by anyone whom the United States might select; and even
consent to suit by the United States for a particular person's benefit is not
consent to suit by that person himself.
Id.
193. Id.
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sister states.1 9 4 This is justified by the fact that the concession is
mutual. 19 5 For example, because Illinois is not immune from a federal suit brought by New York, New York is not immune from suit
by Illinois. Illinois' and New York's immunities in relation to each
other are equal.
However, Indian tribes were not represented parties in the constitutional convention and, thus, could not have surrendered their
sovereign immunity. 1 9 6 Further, tribes are granted immunity from
suits brought by a state. 197 If a state implicitly consented to suit by
a tribe, the states' and the tribes' immunities in relation to each
other would be unbalanced in favor of the tribe. Therefore, Indian
tribes are not to be treated as sister states, and a suit brought by a
tribe against a state under the IGRA will not overcome the state's
immunity because the state did not consent to being sued by an
Indian tribe in a federal court when the state joined the Union. 19 8
A state may also implicitly consent to suit under the theory expressed in Parden v. Terminal Railway.19 9 Under Parden, when a
tate voluntarily engages in an activity which the federal government has regulated pursuant to the Commerce Clause, the state
has constructively consented to suit under that federal regulation. 20 0 Applying Parden to the IGRA, if a state voluntarily engages in the conduct of regulating Class III gambling described in
Section 2710 of the IGRA, the state may be held to have implicitly
20 1
consented to a lawsuit brought by an Indian tribe.
However, courts have interpreted the Pardentheory quite narrowly. 20 2 Since that case was decided, no court has found consent
194. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 295 (1904) (holding
states waived their immunity from suits by other states when they adopted the
Constitution).
195. See Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2582-83 (holding that it is the mutuality of
concession which makes the states' surrender of immunity from suits by sister
states plausible and that there is no such mutuality with Indian tribes).

196. Id.
197.

See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,

509 (1991) (holding that Indian tribes possess sovereign immunity from suits
brought by the states).

198. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2582. The Court justified its holding according
to the principle that the federal courts shall be as accessible to the Indians as

they are to other citizens by stating: "But of course, denying Indian tribes the
right to sue States in federal court does not disadvantage them in relation to 'all
other persons.' [The Indian tribe is] asking for access more favorable than that
which others enjoy." Id.
199.

377 U.S. 184 (1964).

200. Id. at 187; Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550,
556 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
201. See PoarchBand of Creek Indians, 776 F. Supp. at 557 (holding that
Alabama did not implicitly consent to suit by negotiating a tribal-state compact
with the tribe).

202. See id. at 556 (stating that the Parden theory of implicit consent should

not be applied expansively).
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to suit under the Parden theory.20 3 In Edelman v. Jordan,20 4 the
Supreme Court limited the Parden theory of consent to situations
in which Congress has expressly indicated that participation in an
20 5
activity by a state will result in a waiver of immunity.
Today, the standard for determining whether Congress intended a state to be amenable to suit is whether a federal regulation states this "in unmistakably clear language."20 6 The IGRA
states that the federal courts will have jurisdiction to hear causes of
action arising from a state's failure to negotiate a tribal-state compact in good faith in unmistakably clear language. 20 7 But in order
to establish consent under the Pardentheory, the state must volun20 8
tarily engage in an activity which Congress has regulated.
The IGRA regulates a state's negotiations with a tribe to enter
into a tribal-state compact. 20 9 However, the activity of merely negotiating with a tribe is insufficient conduct to waive a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. 2 10 Further, under the IGRA, a tribe
may bring suit against a state which refuses to negotiate an agreement to regulate Class III gaming. 2 11 Thus, negotiating a tribalstate compact does not appear to be voluntary conduct for the state.
The state is faced with the choice of refusing to negotiate and risking suit or negotiating and waiving its immunity to suit.2 12 Hence,
a state which does not enter negotiations with a tribe pursuant to
the IGRA cannot be held to have waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity under the Parden theory by voluntarily engaging in the
activities regulated by the IGRA. 2 13 Therefore, a tribe must over203. Id.
204. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
205. Id. at 673. The Court noted that constitutional rights are not commonly
surrendered by merely implied consent. Id.
206. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Trans., 483 U.S. 468, 478
(1987).
207. See Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550, 557
(S.D. Ala. 1991) (holding that Congress expressed its intention to grant federal
district courts the authority to hear IGRA cases in unmistakable clarity).
208. Id. at 556; Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
209. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988).
210. See Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp. at 557 (holding that Alabama did not
sufficiently engage in regulated activity by negotiating with the Indian tribe).
211. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988).
212. Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp. at 557.
213. In Parden, the Supreme Court ruled that a state may not plead sovereign immunity when it is sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA) because the state chose to own and operate a railroad twenty years
after FELA was enacted. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
The Court held that when the state voluntarily engaged in this activity, it necessarily consented to be sued under the FELA. Id.
The circumstances surrounding a state conducting negotiations with an Indian tribe pursuant to Section 2710 of the IGRA can be distinguished from the
facts of the Parden case. By merely negotiating with an Indian tribe, a state
has not engaged in any business or interstate commerce. See id. at 192. Unlike
the state of Alabama in Parden, a state which negotiates with a tribe does not
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come the state's sovereign immunity by either the Young doctrine
or by establishing that Congress abrogated the state's immunity by
enacting the IGRA because states will not expressly or implicitly
consent to a lawsuit brought by a tribe under the IGRA.

B. An Individual Officer May Not Bear the Burden for the State
Under the Young Doctrine
An Indian tribe which brings an action against a state for failing to negotiate a tribal-state compact in good faith cannot circumvent the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Young
doctrine. 2 14 Under Exparte Young, 2 15 one may bring a suit against
a state officer to enjoin the official's violation of federal law. 2 16 The
state official is not afforded immunity under the Eleventh Amendment in such situations. 2 17 However, in an IGRA claim, a federal
court cannot assert jurisdiction over a state official based on Young
for two reasons. First, the court cannot compel the official to perform a discretionary act. Second, the state is the real party in inter2 18
est, not the official.
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that state officials
who violate the Constitution or federal laws are not afforded the
state's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 2 19 The Court
reasoned that, because the state could not authorize such conduct,
the state official was stripped of his representative status and could
stand to profit monetarily by conducting this activity. Further, Congress has
retained any benefit a state may obtain under the IGRA, such as overcoming
the Indian's own sovereign immunity, until after a tribal-state compact has
been concluded. Thus, during the negotiation period itself, the state does not
benefit by engaging in activity pursuant to the IGRA.
214. See Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D.
Ala. 1992) (holding that the Indian tribe's action against the state official is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
215. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
216. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding that the court may
grant prospective injunctive relief against a state official who violates the federal laws or Constitution).
217. TRIBE, supra note 29, § 3-27, at 189.
218. See PoarchBand, 784 F. Supp. at 1552 (holding that a court may not
order a state official to negotiate with an Indian tribe in good faith because this
is not a ministerial duty and the state is the real party in interest).
219. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56. In Young, the Supreme Court held
that a federal district court could enjoin Minnesota's Attorney General from
enforcing a railroad rate-setting statute which fined and imprisoned violators
as criminals. Id. The Court held that Minnesota's statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and stated:
[Ilndividuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in
regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State, and who threaten and
are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to
enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such
action.

Id.
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be held accountable for his actions. 22 0 When a plaintiff sues a state
official, the federal court may grant an injunction which governs
the official's future conduct. 22 1 Thus, under Young, an Indian tribe
may attempt to circumvent a state's sovereign immunity by bringing a suit against an individual rather than the state.
For example, an Indian tribe which intends to operate Class III
gaming on its land must first negotiate a tribal-state compact with
the state in which the tribal lands are located, and the IGRA provides that states must negotiate a compact in good faith.2 22 Therefore, before a tribe commences Class III gaming on its land, it must
notify a state official, for example, the governor, that the tribe
223
wishes to negotiate a tribal-state compact pursuant to the IGRA.
If the negotiations are unsuccessful, the tribe may bring a suit
against the state official alleging that the official acted in violation
224
of a federal law by failing to negotiate the compact in good faith.
The tribe may contend that the state official is not granted the
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the theory of Young. Thus,
the tribe may ask the court to compel the state official to formulate
a tribal-state compact under the provisions provided in the
220. Id. at 159-60. The Court further ruled:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of
the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment
comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he
is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The
State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to
the supreme authority of the United States.
Id.
221. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03
(1984); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 677. In Edelman, the Court ruled it was proper to
issue an injunction against the state official to prospectively enjoin him from
failing to process aid to the aged, blind, or disabled, but the Court would not
award retroactive relief for benefits which had been wrongfully withheld. Id.
The Court recognized that an expansive reading of Young would hinder the protective value of the Eleventh Amendment. TRIBE, supranote 29, § 3-27, at 192.
The Edelman exception to Young does not bar prospective remedies, even if
they involve expenditures by the state. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 692-93
(1978). The Court held in Hutto that, even though the award constituted monies that would be paid by the state, the award of attorneys' fees against state
prison officials for their bad faith unconstitutional actions did not involve an
Eleventh Amendment violation. Id. The Court has also stated that when monetary relief is sought against a state officer, the monetary relief must be ancillary to the prospective injunctive relief. Kentucky v. Grahm, 473 U.S. 159, 169
n.17 (1985). In Pennhurst,the Court further limited the scope of Young. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 89, 120-21. The Court held that an allegation of a state officer's violation of state law, even if brought under pendent jurisdiction, would
not remove the Eleventh Amendment bar because no federal constitutional
predicate existed for limiting the sovereign immunity without a violation of federal law. Id.
222. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988).
223. Id. § 2710(d)(2)(A).
224. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
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IGRA. 225 For this reason, the court may grant an injunction governing the state official's future conduct under the Young doctrine.
2 26
However, courts have interpreted this doctrine narrowly.
The Supreme Court itself, in Young, stated that in a suit against a
state official, the federal court may compel the official to perform
his ministerial duty, but the court cannot direct the official to perform a discretionary act. 22 7 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Washington, in Spokane Tribe of Indians v.
Washington,2 28 addressed the issue of whether compelling a state
official to conclude a tribal-state compact as provided in the IGRA
22 9
was an infringement of the officer's discretionary judgment.
In Spokane Tribe, the tribe sent a letter to the governor of
Washington requesting to negotiate a tribal-state compact pursuant to the IGRA. 2 30 After two years of unsuccessful negotiations,
the tribe brought action against the governor of Washington premised on his failure to negotiate in good faith.2 31 The court denied
the governor's motion to dismiss because, under the Young doctrine, the governor's Eleventh Amendment immunity was
voided. 232 While the court did not rule that compelling the gover225. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
remedies available under the IGRA when a state has failed to conduct good
faith negotiations.
226. See supra note 221. Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence involves two
strands, namely the nature of the relief sought and the scope of the authorized
action. Tribe, supra note 29, § 3-27, at 193-94. This is why the Court's analysis
of the fiction adopted in Young has often been described as "incoherent, technical, and removed from first principles." Id. However, the IGRA action
presented in this Note does not involve the analysis of both strands of the Eleventh Amendment. The relief sought in this action only involves an injunction
ordering a state to negotiate in good faith. This clearly falls within the Young
limitation of prospective injunctive relief.
227. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158 (1908). The Young fiction simply
requires a state officer to act within the scope of his duty, and when he exceeds
this duty, he is not acting on behalf of the state. TRIBE, supra note 29, § 3-27, at
189. Thus, an injunction may only require a state officer to carry out his official
duties. Id. However, a federal court may order a state officer to exercise his
discretion in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). The Supreme Court has ordered state officials to institute a remedial desegregation program with the state financing the program,
id., and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has ordered the members of a
state personnel board to hold a termination hearing to afford the terminated
employee his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights, Brown v.
Georgia Dept. of Revenue, 881 F.2d 1018 (11th Cir. 1989). An IGRA action is
not brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, and a federal court cannot order a state official to perform a discretionary act. Poarch Band of Creek Indians
v. Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1549, 1551 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
228. 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
229. Id. at 1062.
230. Id. at 1059.
231. Id. In this same action, the court granted the state's motion to dismiss
the action against the state because the action was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and because the court was without jurisdiction. Id. at 1061.
232. Id. at 1063.
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nor to negotiate with the tribe in good faith was included in the
governor's ministerial duties, and thus a discretionary act, it reasoned that only by its assertion of jurisdiction over the governor
would the tribe be left with a forum in which to present its contentions. 233 Thus, the necessity for giving the tribe a judicial forum
outweighed any potential infringement of gubernatorial
234
discretion.
The balancing test applied by the Spokane Tribe court exceeds
the scope of Young. 23 5 When the Supreme Court adopted this legal
fiction in Young, it specifically stated that a court may only require
an affirmative action which is ministerial in nature. 236 Two
months after the Spokane Tribe case was decided, a federal district
court in Alabama addressed this same issue.
In Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama,2 37 after dis-

missing the state from the action for lack of jurisdiction, the court
addressed the issue of whether a suit may be maintained against
the governor for violating the IGRA by failing to negotiate with the
tribe in good faith. 238 The court concluded that the Young doctrine
did not give the court jurisdiction to order the governor to negotiate
a compact with the tribe as contemplated by the IGRA because this
required discretion on the governor's behalf. 23 9 Negotiating an
233.

Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (E.D.

Wash. 1991). This decision of the court in Spokane Tribe is not in accordance

with existing case law. The action at bar was not in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and thus, the court exceeded its authority by ordering a state official to perform a discretionary act. See supra note
227 (discussing those situations in which a court may order a state official to

perform a discretionary act). Further, the court acknowledged that it was

aware its ruling would infringe upon the state official's discretion; however, it

nevertheless proceeded to break from precedent in light of this in order not to
deprive the tribe of a forum in which to raise its contentions concerning the

state's bad faith. Spokane Tribe, 790 F. Supp. at 1062-63.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Spokane Tribe, 790 F. Supp. at 1063.
See supra note 233 (discussing the balancing test the court invoked).
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158 (1908).
784 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
Id. at 1550. The court dismissed the state in a prior action in which the

court allowed the tribe to amend its complaint to include an action against the

governor. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550, 563
(S.D. Ala. 1991). The tribe amended its complaint, and this action ensued.

Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
239. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1549, 1551-52

(S.D. Ala. 1991). The court concluded:
For this Court to order the Governor and the Tribe to conclude a Tribal-

State compact.., would clearly be to order the Governor to exercise discretion. Negotiating with the plaintiffs to institute a state policy is by no
means ministerial and involves discretion in ways not contemplated by a
court order directing a party to refrain from instituting a prosecution under
an unconstitutional statute as in Young, to comply with federal time limits
in processing AABD applications as in [Edelman v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332
(1979)]... or to pay attorney's fees as in [Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978)]. Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction to order the Gover-
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agreement which will govern the conduct of gambling activities on
Indian land requires both the state representative and the tribal
representative to exercise discretion because, in order to conclude
such an agreement, some form of compromise is inevitable. The
state representative must exercise discretion in determining which
provisions to compromise and which provisions to push adamantly
during negotiations for a tribal-state compact. Therefore, a court
may not assert jurisdiction over a state official in an IGRA action
because the court may not compel a state official to perform a discretionary act under Young. 240 Under this reasoning, the limited
exception to sovereign immunity created by Young does not apply to
the situation presented in this Note.
Furthermore, a suit against a state official under the IGRA
may not be maintained under the theory of Young because such suit
is in reality a suit against the state. 2 41 If the state is the real party
in interest, the Eleventh Amendment bar is not removed by seeking
injunctive relief against a state officer. 2 42 The state is considered
the real party in interest when a potential judgment would restrain
the state from acting or would compel it to act.24 3 In an action

based on the IGRA against a state official for failing to negotiate in
24 4
good faith, the state is the real party in interest.

The IGRA does not specify which individual or group is authorized to negotiate a compact on behalf of the state. The IGRA merely
requires that "the state shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good
faith to enter into ... a compact." 24 5 A suit in which a tribe brings
nor to negotiate with the plaintiff Tribe or to conclude a Compact as contemplated by the [IGRA].
Id.
240. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 158 (1908) (holding that a court may
only order a state official to perform ministerial duties).
241. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-102
(1984) (holding that an action may not be maintained against a state officer
under Young when the state is the real party in interest).
242. See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982) (demonstrating that, by distinguishing suits against state officers from impermissible suits against the
state itself, Edelman did not intend to abandon Young in favor of a test which
looked solely to the relief requested by the plaintiff).
243. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 n.11. The Court also explained that the
state is the real party in interest where "'the judgment sought would expend
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the judgment would be to restrain the Government from acting, or
compel it to act." Id. (quoting Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)).
244. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 784 F. Supp. 1549, 1552 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
The court concluded that ordering the governor to negotiate a tribal-state compact with the tribe would only operate against the state because the state would
be bound by any compact the governor negotiates. Id.
245. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988). A state official, such as the governor,
does not even possess the authority to enter a tribal-state compact on behalf of
the state. Kansas v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169, 1179 (Kan. 1992). In Finney, the
Kickapoo Nation of Kansas and Governor Finney entered into a tribal-state
compact. Id. at 1173-74. However, the Attorney General of Kansas brought an
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an action against a state official seeking a decree requiring the official to conclude a tribal-state compact is in reality one against the
state. 246 While the officer is compelled to act to negotiate a compact, it is the state itself which is affected by this order because it
will be bound by this tribal-state compact even after the particular
official is no longer in office. Thus, the Young doctrine does not
impart jurisdiction to a federal court in such a suit against a state
official under the IGRA because the state is the real party in interest and the Eleventh Amendment bars this action.
C. Congress Did Not Abrogate the States' Immunity When It
Enacted the IGRA
An Indian tribe may attempt to overcome the Eleventh Amendment bar by claiming that Congress abrogated the states' sovereign
immunity when it enacted the IGRA pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. 24 7 Congress must satisfy two criteria in order to successfully abrogate the states' immunity. First, Congress must
express its intent to nullify the states' immunity in unmistakably
clear language. 248 Second, Congress must also possess the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity. 24 9 Thus far, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress does possess this abrogation power
when legislating under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment 2 5° or pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause. 2 5 1 Howaction challenging the Governor's authority to negotiate and enter into such
compact without the Kansas Legislature's approval. Id. The court concluded
that the Governor did have the authority to negotiate with the tribe, but, without a legislative delegation of power to approve the compact, the Governor had
no power to bind the state to the terms of the compact. Id. at 1179. Thus,
following Finney, a court order requiring a state official to negotiate and enter
into a compact with a tribe may not be carried out because the official most
likely lacks the authority to enter into such a compact without legislative
approval.
246. See PoarchBand, 784 F. Supp. at 552 (dismissing the action against the
governor because the state was the real party in interest).
247. See generally Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan,
800 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (E.D. Wash. 1991); PoarchBand, 784 F. Supp.
at 562 (illustrating Indian tribes' attempts to overcome the states' immunity by
claiming Congress nullified this immunity when it enacted the IGRA). The Indian Commerce Clause is found at Article III, Section Eight of the Constitution,
and provides: "The Congress shall have Power To regulate Commerce with the
Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
248. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 (1991);
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 226 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (holding that congressional abrogation must be expressed in unmistakably clear language).
249. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that Congress
may remove the sovereign immunity bar when it legislates under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
250. See id. at 456 (holding that Congress has abrogation power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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ever, Congress enacted the IGRA pursuant to the Indian Commerce
Clause, 252 and the Court has yet to determine whether Congress
has abrogation authority when legislating pursuant to that
provision.
The United States Supreme Court has held that Congress may
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from suit in federal court
only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute. 2 53 To satisfy this requirement, Congress must literally
include the states in its authorization to sue a class of defendants. 25 4 Congress expressed its intention to annul immunity in the

IGRA by stating as follows:
The United States District Courts shall have jurisdiction over.., any
cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a
State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of
entering into a Tribal-State compact.., or to conduct such negotiations in good faith ...

255

Congress expressly provided federal jurisdiction over claims
brought by Indian tribes against states to compel good faith negotiations under the IGRA. Furthermore, Congress made its intention
to abrogate the states' immunity in unmistakable clarity by listing
the states among the class of defendants against which this statute
authorizes suit. 25

6

Therefore, because Congress expressed its in-

tent to override the states' immunity in unmistakably clear language in the IGRA, the analysis must focus on whether Congress
possessed the authority to make states amenable to suit in federal
courts when legislating pursuant to the Indian Commerce
25 7
Clause.
251. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (holding Congress has abrogation power when legislating pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause).
252. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
253. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 2584 (1991);
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 226 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (espousing the "unmistakably clear language" rule).
254. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974) (holding that a federal
district court could not order Illinois officials to release and remit federally subsidized welfare benefits illegally withheld from Illinois citizens because Congress did not include Illinois in the authorized class of defendants).
255. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) (1988).
256. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 657-58 (S.D.
Fla. 1992); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F.
Supp. 1484, 1488-89 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550, 557-58 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (holding Congress clearly expressed its intent to abrogate the states' immunity in the IGRA).
257. This issue has been addressed in five United States district courts: four
held that Congress does not have the power to abrogate state immunity vis-avie the Indian Commerce Clause, Sault Ste. Marie, 800 F. Supp. at 1489; Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (E.D. Wash.
1991); PoarchBand, 776 F. Supp. at 561-62; Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Mississippi, No. J90-0386(B), slip op. at 13 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 9, 1991), and
only one held otherwise, Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 658. The Supreme
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Supreme Court decisions have allowed Congress to abrogate
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity since 1976.258 The Court
limited this power to congressional enactments under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment 259 for over a decade. 260 In 1989, the
Supreme Court held, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,261 that
Congress also has the authority to override states' immunity when
legislating pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause. 26 2 However, the Court has yet to extend this abrogation power to congressional enactments pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, under
26 3
which Congress enacted the IGRA.

Currently, five federal district courts have addressed the issue
of whether Congress had the authority to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity when it enacted the IGRA under the Indian Com2 65
merce Clause. 26 4 The district court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida
Court has yet to address the issue of whether Congress may abrogate the states'
immunity when legislating pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.
258. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 (1991).
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), was the first abrogation case. In
determining that Congress abrogated the states' immunity by adopting the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Court in Fitzpatrick made use
of the requirement that the language of the statute must clearly express Congress' intent to hold states amenable to suit. Id. at 451-52. The Court acquired
this standard from the case law existing at the time on the principle of "implied
consent," discussed supra notes 181-213 and accompanying text. As such, the
Fitzpatrick decision created much confusion and the theories of implied consent
and abrogation were often not distinguished. Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp. at
560. The Supreme Court in Blatchford, however, made it clear that implied
consent and abrogation are two separate and distinct lines of inquiry. Blatchford, 111 S.Ct. at 2585.
259. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment enables Congress to enact
appropriate legislation to enforce the guarantees of that Amendment. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
260. In Fitzpatrick, the Court limited Congress' abrogation power to Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment because this subsequent Amendment, by its
terms, necessarily curtailed the principles of state sovereignty contained in the
Eleventh Amendment. 427 U.S. at 456.
261. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
262. Id. at 13-23.
263. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 658 (S.D. Fla.
1992). Congress stated that its purpose in enacting IGRA under the Indian
Commerce Clause was "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming
by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, selfsufficiency, and strong tribal governments." 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1988).
264. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 658 (holding that Congress did abrogate
the states' immunity in enacting the IGRA and had the constitutional power to
do so under the Indian Commerce Clause); Sault Ste. Marie v. Michigan, 800 F.
Supp. 1484, 1489 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Mississippi, No. 90-386, 1991 WL 255614 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (holding that the
tribe could not bring suit because of the state's sovereign immunity); Spokane
Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (E.D. Wash. 1991)
(denying congressional power to abrogate states' immunity under the Indian
Commerce Clause); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp.
550, 557-58 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (holding that there was no abrogation of the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the enactment of the IGRA).
265. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 655.
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was the only court to hold that Congress had this authority. 26 6 The
Seminole Tribe court held that Congress may abrogate the states'
immunity pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, just as it may
nullify this sovereign immunity under the Interstate Commerce
Clause, 26 7 because Congress possesses plenary power under both
provisions. 268 The court also based its decision on the fact that congressional powers over both interstate and Indian commerce derive
from the same section in the Constitution, 269 and concluded the
2 70
IGRA properly nullified the state's immunity.
However, in Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama,2 71 the
court held Congress does not have the power to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity when enacting legislation pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. 2 72 This court noted the fact
that Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,273 in which the Supreme
Court held Congress may abrogate the states' immunity vis-a-vis
the Interstate Commerce Clause,2 74 was a five-to-four plurality decision. 2 75 As such, the Poarch Band court ruled extending Union
266.

Id. at 658.

267. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (holding that Congress may abrogate state immunity when legislating
under the Interstate Commerce Clause).
268. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 660. In Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989)
the Court stated that Congress' power in the context of the Commerce Clause is
"plenary" in that "with one hand [it] gives power to Congress while, with the
other, it takes power away from the States.... The important point... is that
the provision both expands federal power and contracts state power.... " Id.
at 16-17. In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), the Court noted the
unique status of Indian tribes under federal law and stated that the Constitution itself implicitly and explicitly grants Congress plenary power to legislate
pursuant to the special problems of Indians. Id. at 551-52.
269. U.S. CONST. art. I, §'8, cl. 3 (providing that 'The Congress shall have
Power To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes"). The court, however, overlooks the distinction expressed in this grant of authority to Congress. The Commerce Clause
clearly distinguishes foreign Nations, the States, and Indian tribes as separate
entities. Id.; see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831) (considering the three classes addressed in the Commerce Clause to be distinct
entities).
270. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 661.
271. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala.
1991).
272. Id. at 557-62.
273. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
274. Id. at 23.
275. PoarchBand, 776 F. Supp. at 558. The Supreme Court was oddly di-

vided when it decided Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 23-57. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, authored the plurality opinion of
the Court on the issue of abrogation. Id. In one paragraph of his concurrence,
Justice White cast the deciding vote on the constitutional issue of abrogation by
stating, "I agree with the conclusion reached by Justice Brennan... that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of the States, although I do not agree with much of his reasoning."
Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring); see HART & WECHSLER'S, THE FEDERAL COURTS
& THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 93-94 (Paul M. Bator et al. eds., 3d ed. Supp. 1989)
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Gas to include congressional abrogation power in legislative enactments pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause would be an "un2 76
warrantably expansive application" of- this plurality decision.
The court also based this decision on the Supreme Court's ruling in
27 7
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico.
In Cotton Petroleum, a tax apportionment case, the Supreme
Court declared the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce
Clauses to have very different applications. 2 78 The Court further
stated that the extensive case law which the Interstate Commerce
Clause has promulgated is a result of the unique role of the states
in our constitutional government and does not adapt well to cases

(demonstrating the confusion potentially generated by Justice White's concurrence). Justice Scalia and the three remaining judges dissented to the decision
of the abrogation issue noting that "instead of cleaning up the allegedly muddied Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence produced by Hans, the Court leaves
that in place, and adds to the clutter the astounding principle that Article III
limitations can be overcome by simply exercising Article I powers." Union Gas,
491 U.S. at 44-45 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus,
this plurality opinion does not deserve expansive application. Poarch Band of
Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550, 558 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
276. Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp. at 559. See also Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 1923. This plurality opinion based abrogation on the plenary power of the Interstate Commerce Clause and the surrender of immunity in the "plan of the convention." Id. at 19. However, subsequent courts have been reluctant to extend
the Union Gas decision not only because it was a plurality decision, but because
it does not logically follow the precedent set in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976). PoarchBand, 776 F. Supp. at 562. It is clear that the subsequently
enacted Fourteenth Amendment limits the provisions of the previously existing
Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 560.
However, it is difficult to comprehend how an Article I power of Congress
can limit the Eleventh Amendment because the amendment was adopted with
the purpose of restricting the powers of the federal government under the original Constitution, not the other way around. Id. Further, the Eleventh Amendment did not even exist when Article I and the Constitution were adopted.
Thus, the plurality opinion in Union Gas does not deserve an expansive application. For a more detailed discussion of Union Gas, see James Sherman, Altered
States: The Article I Commerce Power and the Eleventh Amendment in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1413 (1991); Letitia A. Sears, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas: CongressionalAbrogation of State Sovereign Immunity
Under the Commerce Clause, or, Living with Hans, 58 FoRDHAM L. REV. 513
(1989); Merritt R. Blakeslee, The Eleventh Amendment and the States Immunity from Suit by a Private Citizen: Hans v. Louisiana and its Progeny after
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company, 24 GA. L. REV. 113 (1989).
277. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191-92 (1989).
278. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 191-92 (distinguishing the boundaries between the states' regulatory authority and Indian tribes' self-government). The Supreme Court stated that "It is also well established that the
Interstate Commerce and the Indian Commerce Clauses have very different applications." Id. at 192. As Chief Justice Marshall stated, "The objects to which
the power of regulating commerce might be directed, are divided into three distinct classes - foreign nations, the several states, and Indian Tribes ... the
convention considered them as entirely distinct." Id. (citing Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831)).
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which involve the Indian Commerce Clause. 2 79 Case law surrounding the Interstate Commerce Clause does not properly apply to
trade with Indian tribes because states and tribes have concurrent
jurisdiction over the same territory, whereas interstate commerce
cases were developed in the context of commerce among states with
mutually exclusive territorial jurisdiction. 2 s0 Thus, the Poarch
Band Creek court concluded that this implication of Cotton Petroleum, coupled with a narrow interpretation of Union Gas, required
a conclusion that Congress did not have abrogation powers when it
28
enacted the IGRA pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. '
Two subsequent courts, applying slightly different reasoning,
reached the same conclusion as the PoarchBand court. In Spokane
Tribe v. Washington,28 2 the court first relied upon Cotton Petroleum 28 3 to conclude that it was inappropriate to apply theories from
the Interstate Commerce Clause to the Indian Commerce
Clause. 28 4 The Spokane Tribe court also relied upon Blatchford v.
28 5
Native Village of Noatak.

In Blatchford, the Supreme Court held that in the context of
the Interstate Commerce Clause, states have surrendered immunity to each other, producing a mutual concession, but in relation to
the Indian Commerce Clause, Indian tribes have retained immunity from suits brought by states, and no mutual concession exists. 2 8 6 Because the tribes have retained their immunity from suits
by states, the Court in Blatchford held that the states have retained
279. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192 (stating that the case law developed under the Interstate Commerce Clause should not be binding authority on
cases brought under the Indian Commerce Clause).
280. Id.
281. See Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550, 558
(S.D. Ala. 1991) (holding that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate state
immunity when legislating under the Indian Commerce Clause). There the
Court stated:
Because Union Gas is not directly on point, and with an eye toward the
shaky ground on which it stands, this Court does not find the decision to be
controlling. The weakness of the plurality opinion leads this Court to believe that it should not be given an expansive application and that, read
narrowly, it does not require a determination that Congress had the power
to abrogate Alabama's Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.

Id.
282. 790 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
283. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. 163; see supra notes 276-80 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
284. Spokane Tribe, 790 F. Supp. at 1060-61.
285. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred an action brought by an Indian tribe
against a state because the state did not surrender this immunity when they
adopted the Constitution).
286. Id. at 2582-83.
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their immunity from suits brought by Indian tribes. 28 7 Relying
upon Blatchford and Cotton Petroleum, the Spokane Tribe court
concluded there was a substantial difference between congressional
power arising from the Indian Commerce Clause and congressional
power stemming from the Interstate Commerce Clause. 28 8 Thus,
the court held that Congress did not have the authority to abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity when it enacted the IGRA under the
28 9
Indian Commerce Clause.
The court in Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v.
Michigan290 also held that Congress lacked the authority to abro29 1
gate the states' immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause.
This court based its decision upon a narrow reading of Union
Gas2 92 because it was a plurality opinion 2 93 and because it held
that when the states formed the Union, they implicitly agreed to
Congress' abrogation authority under the Interstate Commerce
Clause. 2 94 Because Blatchford held that states did not agree to be
sued by Indian tribes, 2 95 the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe court determined it would be inappropriate to extend Union Gas to apply to
the Indian Commerce Clause, and therefore, Congress lacked the
power to abrogate state immunity when legislating under the In2 96
dian Commerce Clause.
287. Id. at 2581-83. In Blatchford, the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1362 did
not express Congress' intent to abrogate the states' immunity in unmistakably
clear language and, thus, the Court did not address the issue of abrogation. Id.
The importance of the mutuality of concession between the states and Indian
tribes the Blatchford Court discusses is imported into abrogation by the Union
Gas decision. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-23.
288. Spokane Tribe, 790 F. Supp. at 1061.
289. Id. The court stated, "After reviewing the Blatchford and Cotton Petroleum decisions ... [there is no basis for this court to conclude that Congress
has the authority to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
to suits from Indian Tribes by enacting legislation pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause." Id. at 1061.
290. 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
291. Id. at 1490.
292. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
293. See supra note 275 (discussing the plurality opinion in Union Gas).
294. Sault Ste. Marie, 800 F. Supp. at 1489. See supra note 276 (demonstrating that Union Gas does not logically follow the Supreme Court's opinion in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)).
295. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2582 (1991)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars an action brought by an Indian
tribe against a state because the state did not surrender this immunity when it
adopted the Constitution).
296. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp.
1484, 1489-90 (W.D. Mich. 1992). The plaintiffs in Sault Ste. Marie also asked
the court to declare the IGRA unconstitutional if the court found their suit
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 1490. The court failed to address
this issue, however, because the plaintiffs had yet to bring suit against an officer of the state. Id. Thus, the court held that determining the constitutionality of the IGRA would be premature without first deciding if the suit can
proceed under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Id.
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There is no basis to support the court's holding in Seminole
Tribe29 7 that Congress had the authority to abrogate the states' immunity when it enacted the IGRA pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. 2 98 First, Union Gas was a five-to-four plurality
opinion and subsequent courts should not read it expansively. 299
Next, Union Gas held that Congress can abrogate state immunity
when legislating under the Interstate Commerce Clause because
the states implicitly agreed to this when they formed the Union.3 0 0
The Blatchford court expressly ruled that the states did not agree
to be sued by Indian tribes when joining the Union, 3 0 1 and thus,
Union Gas cannot apply to the Indian Commerce Clause.30 2 Finally, the Supreme Court opinions in Cotton Petroleum 30 3 and
Blatchford30 4 determined that there is a substantial difference between the congressional power stemming from the Interstate Commerce Clause and Congress' power when legislating pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause. 30 5 For these reasons, when Congress enacted the IGRA pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, it lacked
the authority to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity, and the
Eleventh Amendment will bar a suit brought by an Indian tribe
under the IGRA against a state arising from the state's lack of good
30 6
faith negotiations.
297.
298.

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (E.D.

Wash. 1991).
299. See supra note 275 (illustrating the weakness of the plurality opinion in
Union Gas and why it should be given less weight than a majority opinion).
300. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1989) (holding that
Congress has abrogation power when legislating pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Clause because Congress' power is plenary and the states implicitly
agreed to these suits when they joined the Union); see also supra notes 260-61
and accompanying text (discussing Congress' abrogation power).
301. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2582 (1991)
(holding the Eleventh Amendment bars an action brought by an Indian tribe
against a state because the state did not surrender this immunity when they
adopted the Constitution).
302. See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F.
Supp. 1484, 1489 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that Congress does not have the
power to abrogate state immunity when legislating under the Indian Commerce
Clause).
303. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191-92 (1989).
304. Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2582.
305. See supra notes 278-80 and 286-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's distinction between the Interstate and the Indian

Commerce Clauses.

306. See generally Sault Ste. Marie, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992);
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Mississippi, No. J90-0386(B), 1991 WL
255614 (S.D. Miss. 1991); Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp.
1057 (E.D. Wash. 1991); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F.
Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (holding that Congress lacked the authority to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity when it enacted the IGRA pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause).
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PROPOSED SOLUTION TO CIRCUMVENT STATES' ELEVENTH

AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

In the hypothetical case, 30 7 the Tatanka Indians strived to
achieve financial security for their tribe. After having limited success conducting bingo games, the Tatanka attempted to reach this
objective by operating casino-type gambling on their reservation.
The Tatanka followed the procedures set forth in the IGRA and met
with the state to negotiate an agreement to regulate the gambling
conducted on the Tatanka reservation. 308 However, Caledonia officials were unwilling to allow the Tatanka to conduct forms of gambling which the IGRA authorizes.3 0 9 After eight months of
unsuccessful negotiations, the Tatanka brought suit against Caledonia and the governor in federal district court asking the court to
order the state to comply with the IGRA and negotiate in good faith
with the Tatanka. 3 10
However, IGRA in its present form fails to give Indian tribes,
such as the Tatanka, a forum in which to raise allegations of improper conduct on behalf of the states. As previously discussed, the
Eleventh Amendment 3 1' bars a tribe's action against a state under
the IGRA arising from the states' lack of good faith negotiations
because Congress enacted the IGRA under the Indian Commerce
Clause. 3 12 Furthermore, federal district courts are unable to assert

jurisdiction over an Indian tribe's IGRA claim based on any of the
exceptions to state sovereign immunity: consentwaiver, 3 13 the
Young doctrine, 3 14 or congressional abrogation. 3 15 However, Congress could have avoided this jurisdictional problem, and the
Tatanka could have had a forum in which to bring suit against the
state, if Congress had enacted the IGRA under the Interstate Com307.

See supra notes 2-20 and accompanying text (explaining the illustrative

hypothetical case of the Tatanka Indians).
308.

See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988); see also supra notes 140-47 and ac-

companying text (discussing the provisions in the IGRA which require Indian
tribes to conclude a tribal-state compact before conducting casino-type gambling on their reservations).
309.

See 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988); see also supra notes 120-27 and accompa-

310.

See 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(7)(A)(i); see also supra notes 143-46 and accom-

nying text (demonstrating the extent of gambling authorized by the IGRA).

panying text (discussing the provision of the IGRA which grants district courts
the authority to hear actions brought by Indian tribes).
311. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
312. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
313.

See supra notes 170-213 and accompanying text (demonstrating that

the consent/waiver exception of sovereign immunity does not apply to the situation presented in this Note).
314. See supra notes 214-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Young doctrine and why this principle will not remove the Eleventh Amendment bar from an Indian tribe's suit under the IGRA.
315. See supra notes 247-306 and accompanying text (discussing why Congress lacked the authority to abrogate the states' immunity when it enacted the
IGRA under the Indian Commerce Clause).
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merce Clause 3 16 instead of the Indian Commerce Clause.
Congress has the authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when legislating pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce clause so long as it expresses its intention to do so in
unmistakably clear language.3 17 In the IGRA, Congress expressed
its intention to abrogate state immunity with unmistakable clarity.3 18 However, Congress enacted the IGRA pursuant to its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause,3 19 under which it lacks
the power to abrogate the states' immunity.3 20 Thus, if Congress
were to enact the IGRA under the Interstate Commerce clause, it
would override the states' sovereign immunity and the federal district courts could than assert jurisdiction over the states in an
IGRA action brought by an Indian tribe. Therefore, Congress
should amend the IGRA to include a statement in its declaration of
policy indicating that Congress intended to enact the IGRA pursu32 1
ant to its authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
316.
317.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1989) (holding

that Congress may override the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when
legislating under the Interstate Commerce Clause).
318. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 658 (S.D.
Fla. 1992); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 801 F.
Supp. 1484, 1489 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama,
776 F. Supp. 550, 557-58 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (holding that Congress clearly expressed its intent to abrogate the states' immunity in the IGRA).
319. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1988); supra note 263 and accompanying text (illustrating Congress' intent to enact the IGRA under the Indian Commerce
Clause).
320. See generally Sault Ste. Marie, 800 F. Supp. at 1489; Mississippi Band
of Choctaw Indians v. Mississippi, No. J90-0386(B), 1991 WL 255614 (S.D.
Miss. 1991); Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 790 F. Supp. 1057, 106061 (E.D. Wash. 1991); PoarchBand, 776 F. Supp. at 557-58 (holding Congress
lacked the authority to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity when it enacted the IGRA pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause).
321. Section 2702 of the IGRA is entitled, "Congressional declaration of policy." 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (Supp 1993). This section provides:

The purpose of this chapter is(1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes
as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and
strong tribal governments;
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian
tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other corrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly
by both the operator and players; and
(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federal regulatory authority for gaming on Indian lands, the establishment of Federal standards
for gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment of a National Indian
Gaming Commission are necessary to meet congressional concerns regarding gaming and to protect such gaming as a means of generating tribal
revenue.
Id. (emphasis added). Congress should amend this section of the IGRA to declare that it is legislating under the Interstate Commerce Clause in order to
avoid the jurisdictional problems deriving from the Eleventh Amendment. Con-
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Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress has the
power to regulate all commerce or activity which affects more than
one state. 32 2 The power to regulate interstate commerce is broad
and permits Congress to regulate all activities except those that are
af-5
completely internal to a single state32 3 or those only remotely 32
fecting other states.3 24 For example, in Katzenbach v. McClung,
a restaurant in Alabama did not permit African-American customers to dine at the restaurant in violation of Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.326 In deciding whether the discriminatory practices of the restaurant had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the Court took into account the location of the restaurant,
which was in close proximity to an interstate highway, and the fact
that 46% of the food purchased came from out of state.3 2 7 The
Court held Congress could regulate the restaurant pursuant to the
Interstate Commerce Clause because its policy of discriminating
against African-American people had a restrictive effect upon their
interstate travel and, thus, had a detrimental effect on the quantity
of the restaurant's business. 3 28 This in turn affected interstate
commerce because it would affect the amount of food the restaurant
reducing the flow of
purchased from outside the state, thereby 329
money in the stream of interstate commerce.
Likewise, gambling on Indian reservations affects interstate
commerce because the practice depends upon goods and visitors
from out of state. More likely than not, the Tatanka would have to
obtain betting chips, blackjack and craps tables, roulette wheels,
slot machines, or other gambling paraphernalia from outside the
state. Moreover, the Tatanka reservation is located near the border
gress may accomplish this by amending the italicized portion of the previous
section of the IGRA as follows: "Under the Power granted in the Interstate
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, the purpose of this chapter is ......
322. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (enforcing
National Labor Relations Board rules preventing unfair labor practices from
affecting commerce). There, the Court stated that, "Although activities may be
intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close
and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control." Id. at 37.
323. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824) (holding that
the power of Congress to regulate the shipping industry under the Interstate
Commerce Clause preempted a conflicting New York licensing law which
granted exclusive rights to operate ships in New York waters).
324. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 15 (stating that Congress does not
have the power to regulate commerce which only trivially affects other states
because this would destroy the concept of federalism).
325. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
326. Id. at 297.
327. Id. at 303-05.
328. Id. at 300.
329. Id. See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
271 (1964) (holding that Congress "has the power to regulate local instrumentalities ... if their activities burden the flow of commerce among the States").
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of two states and expects to attract visitors from both at its casino.330 Therefore, conducting gambling on the Tatanka reserva-

tion would affect interstate commerce by increasing the number of
travelers and goods flowing into the stream of commerce, and Congress could regulate this activity under the Interstate Commerce
Clause.
A single local Indian gambling operation, such as that proposed
by the Tatanka, may have only a minimal impact on interstate commerce as a whole because the amount of money and gamblers
brought into the state are relatively small. However, due to the
sheer number of tribes now partaking in Indian gambling, 33 1 the
cumulative effect of Indian gambling on interstate commerce is substantial.3 32 Since the enactment of the IGRA, reservation gambling
has become a billion dollar industry. 3 33 This influx of money into
the stream of commerce affects the states where Indian gambling
occurs, states where those partaking in the gambling reside, and
states where gambling paraphernalia is manufactured and sold.
Therefore, the cumulative effect of Indian gambling on interstate
commerce is substantial, and Congress should regulate Indian gambling under the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Congress should enact the IGRA33 4 pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce clause. 335 Congress has the power to enact the IGRA
under this clause because Indian gambling has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. When Congress enacted the IGRA under
the Indian Commerce Clause, it failed to provide a forum accessible
to tribes to bring action when the states did not negotiate in good
faith. Because Congress has the power to abrogate the states' immunity when regulating interstate commerce, 3 36 Congress may
eliminate this jurisdictional problem by indicating that it intended
330. See supra note 9 (describing the location of the Tatanka reservation).
331. Today, over half of America's two hundred eighty Indian reservations
are operating some type of casino. Gambling; Bugsy and the Indians, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1992, at 27. In 1992, Indian gambling operations grossed $5.4 billion. Rogers Worthington, And Where it Stops Nobody Knows, CHI. TRiB., Aug.
22, 1993, § 10, at 14, 15. There are currently 54 Indian casinos and 64 tribes
now have tribal-state compacts with 19 states-in comparison with the 19 tribal-state compacts with 6 states which existed only two years ago. Id.
332. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (urging that even
purely local activities may be "reached by Congress if [they collectively] exert
...a substantial economic effect on commerce").
333. James N. Baker, Gambling on the Reservations, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17,
1992, at 29. Revenues from the Indian gaming industry are now close to the
$1.4 billion the Bureau of Indian Affairs spends on tribal services. Gambling;
Bugsy and the Indians, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1992, at 27.
334. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
335. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
336. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that Congress has the authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
when legislating pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause of the
Constitution).
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to govern Indian gambling under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Therefore, Congress should amend the IGRA with a short statement declaring it is enacting the IGRA pursuant to its powers
granted by the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 3 37
CONCLUSION

The purpose of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act is to promote
tribal economic independence through gambling. Under the IGRA,
an Indian tribe must enter an agreement with the state prior to
conducting casino-type gambling on its reservation. However,
although the IGRA requires states to negotiate this agreement in
good faith, states may frustrate the purpose of the IGRA by stalling
negotiations or refusing to negotiate at all because states are immune from suits brought by Indian tribes.
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
bars a suit brought by an Indian tribe against a state which has
failed to negotiate a tribal-state agreement in good faith. Congress
failed to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity when it enacted
the IGRA under the Indian Commerce Clause and, as a result, Indian tribes lack a forum in which to raise their contentions.
Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress has the authority to regulate Indian gambling and the power to abrogate
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. By abrogating the states'
sovereign immunity, Congress would provide federal district courts
with the jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the IGRA against
states and achieve the purpose of promoting tribal self-sufficiency.
Therefore, Congress should amend the IGRA to declare it is enacted
pursuant to the congressional authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Peter T. Glimco

337. See supra note 321 for an example of the form in which the amendment
to the IGRA may successfully defeat the jurisdictional problems deriving from
the existing IGRA.

